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Abstract—We study the problem of optimally investing in nodes
of a social network in a competitive setting, wherein two camps
aim to drive the average opinion of the population in their own
favor. Using a well-established model of opinion dynamics, we
formulate the problem as a zero-sum game with its players
being the two camps. We derive optimal investment strategies
for both camps, and show that a random investment strategy
is optimal when the underlying network follows a popular class
of weight distributions. We study a broad framework, where we
consider various well-motivated settings of the problem, namely,
when the influence of a camp on a node is a concave function of
its investment on that node, when a camp aims at maximizing
competitor’s investment or deviation from its desired investment,
and when one of the camps has uncertain information about the
values of the model parameters. We also study a Stackelberg
variant of this game under common coupled constraints on the
combined investments by the camps and derive their equilibrium
strategies, and hence quantify the first-mover advantage. For a
quantitative and illustrative study, we conduct simulations on
real-world datasets and provide results and insights.
Index Terms—Social networks, opinion dynamics, election,
zero-sum games, common coupled constraints, decision under
uncertainty, Stackelberg game.
I. INTRODUCTION
Opinion dynamics is a natural phenomenon in a system of
cognitive agents, and is a well-studied topic across several
disciplines. It is highly relevant to applications such as elec-
tions, viral marketing, propagation of ideas and behaviors, etc.
In this paper, we consider two competing camps who aim to
maximize the adoption of their respective opinions in a social
network. In particular, we consider a strict competition setting
where the opinion value of one camp is denoted by +1 and
that of the other camp by −1; we refer to these camps as good
and bad camps respectively. Opinion adoption by a population
can be quantified in a variety of ways; here we consider a well-
accepted way, namely, the average or equivalently, the sum of
opinion values of the nodes in the network [1], [2]. Hence the
good camp’s objective would be to maximize this sum, while
the bad camp would aim to minimize it.
The average or sum of opinion values of the nodes or
individuals is of relevance in several applications. In a fund
collection scenario, for instance, the magnitude of the opinion
value of an individual can be viewed as the amount of funds
and its sign as the camp towards which he or she is willing to
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contribute. Another example is that of a group of sensors or
reporting agents, who are assigned the job of reporting their
individual measurements of a particular parameter or event;
the resulting measurement would be obtained by averaging
the individual values. In this case, two competitors may aim
to manipulate the resulting average (one perhaps for a good
cause of avoiding panic, and another for elevating it).
While the opinion values can be unbounded in the above
examples, there are scenarios which can be modeled aptly
by bounded opinion values. In elections, for instance, an
individual can vote at most once. Here one could view bounded
opinion value of an individual as a proxy for the probability
with which the individual would vote for a camp. For instance,
an opinion value of v ∈ [−1,+1] could imply that the
probability of voting for the good camp is (1 + v)/2 and
that of voting for the bad camp is (1 − v)/2. Hence the
good (or respectively bad) camp would want to maximize (or
respectively minimize) the sum of opinion values, since this
sum would indicate the expected number of votes in favor of
the good camp. Product adoption is another example where
bounded opinion values are well justified; the opinion value
of an individual would indicate its probability of purchasing
the product from the company that corresponds to good camp.
Social networks play a prime role in determining the opin-
ions, preferences, behaviors, etc. of the constituent individuals
[3]. There have been efforts to develop models which could
determine how the individuals update their opinions based on
the opinions of their connections, and hence study the dynam-
ics of opinions in the network [4]. With such an underlying
model of opinion dynamics, a camp would aim to maximize
the adoption of its opinion in a social network, in presence
of a competitor. A camp could act on achieving this objective
by strategically investing on selected individuals in a social
network who could adopt its opinion; these individuals would
in turn influence the opinions of their connections, who would
then influence the opinions of their respective connections, and
so on. Based on the underlying application, this investment
could be in the form of money, free products or discounts,
attention, convincing discussions, etc. Given that both camps
have certain budget constraints, the strategy of the good camp
hence comprises of how much to invest on each node in the
network, so as to maximize the sum of opinion values of the
nodes, while that of the bad camp comprises of how much to
invest on each node, so as to minimize this sum.
This setup results in a game, and since we consider a
strict competition setting with constraints such as budget (and
other constraints as we shall encounter), the setup fits into the
framework of constrained zero-sum games [5].
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2A. Motivation
There have been studies to identify influential nodes and
the amounts to be invested on them, specific to analytically
tractable models of opinion dynamics (such as DeGroot) [6],
[7], [2]. Such studies are important to complement the empiri-
cal and experimental studies, since they provide more concrete
results and rigorous reasonings behind them. However, most of
the studies are based in a very preliminary setting and a limited
framework. This paper aims to consider a broader framework
by motivating and analyzing a variety of settings, which could
open interesting future directions for a broader analytical study
of opinion dynamics.
Throughout the paper, we study settings wherein the invest-
ment per node by a camp could be unbounded or bounded.
Bounded investments could be viewed as discounts which
cannot exceed 100%, attention capacity or time constraint of a
voter to receive convincing arguments, company policy to limit
the number of free samples that can be given to a customer,
government policy of limiting the monetary investment by a
camp on a voter, etc. As we will see, bounded investments
in our model would result in bounded opinion values, which
as explained earlier, could be transformed into probability
of voting for a party or adopting a product, and hence the
expected number of votes or sales in the favor of each camp.
We first study in Section III, the cases of unbounded and
bounded investment in a fundamental setting where a camp’s
influence on a node is a linear function of its investment.
While the linear influence function is consistent with the
well-established Friedkin-Johnsen model, the influence of a
camp on a node might not increase linearly with the corre-
sponding investment. In fact, several social and economic set-
tings follow law of diminishing marginal returns, which says
that for higher investments, the marginal returns (influence in
this context) are lower for a marginal increase in investment.
An example of this law is when we watch a particular product
advertisement on television; as we watch the advertisement
more number of times, its marginal influence on us tends to
get lower. A concave influence function naturally captures this
law. We study such an influence function in the settings of both
unbounded and bounded investment per node, and relate it to
the skewness of investment in optimal strategies as well as
user perception of fairness. We study this in Section IV.
There are scenarios where a camp may want to maximize
the total investment of the competing camp, so as to upset the
latter’s broad budget allocation, which might lead to reduction
in its available budget for future investments or for other
channels such as mass media advertisement. The latter may
also be forced to implement unappealing actions such as
increasing the product cost or seek further monetary sources
in order to compensate for its investments. Alternatively, the
camps may have been instructed a desired investment strategy
by a mediator such as government or a central authority,
and deviating from this strategy would incur a penalty. For
instance, the mediator itself would have its own broader
optimization problem (which could be for the benefit for it or
the society), whose optimal solution would require the camps
to devise their investment strategies in a particular desired
way. The mediator would then instruct the camps to follow
the corresponding desired investment strategies, and in case
of violation, the mediator could impose a penalty so as to
compensate for the suboptimal outcome of its own optimiza-
tion problem. For similar reasons as mentioned before, a camp
may want to maximize the penalty incurred by the competing
camp. We study these settings which capture the adversarial
behavior of a camp towards another camp, in Section V.
For all of the aforementioned settings, we show in this
paper that it does not matter whether the camps strategize
simultaneously or sequentially. We use Nash equilibrium as
the equilibrium notion to analyze the game in these settings.
However, there could be settings where a sequential play
would be more natural than a simultaneous one, which would
result in a Stackelberg game. The sequence may be determined
by a mediator or central authority which, for example, may
be responsible for giving permissions for campaigning or
scheduling product advertisements to be presented to a node.
We use subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as the equilibrium
notion for the game in such sequential play settings. Moreover,
since we are concerned with a zero-sum game, we express the
equilibrium in terms of maxmin or minmax. Assuming the
good camp plays first (without loss of analytical generality),
the bad camp would choose a strategy that minimizes the sum
of opinion values as a best response to the good camp’s strat-
egy. Knowing this, the good camp would want to maximize
this minimum value. We motivate two such settings.
It would often be the case that the total attention capacity
of a node or the time it could allot for receiving campaigning
from both camps combined, is bounded. This leads us to
study the game under common coupled constraints (CCC)
that the sum of investments by the camps on any node is
bounded. These are called common coupled constraints since
the constraints of one camp are satisfied if and only if the
constraints of the other camp are satisfied, for every strategy
profile. We study this setting in Section VI.
Another sequential setting is one that results in uncertainty
of information, where the good camp (which plays first) may
not have exact information regarding the network parameters.
However, the bad camp (which plays second) would have
perfect information regarding these parameters, which are
either revealed over time or deduced based on the effect of
the good camp’s investment. Forecasting the optimal strategy
of bad camp, we derive a robust strategy for the good camp
which would give it a good payoff even in the worst case. We
study this setting in Section VII.
It can be noted that the common coupled constraints setting
captures the first mover advantage, while the uncertainty
setting captures the first mover disadvantage.
B. Related Work
A principal part of opinion dynamics in a population is how
nodes update their opinions over time. One of the most well-
accepted and well-studied approaches of updating a node’s
opinion is based on imitation, where each node adopts the
opinion of some of its neighbors with a certain probability.
One such well-established variant is DeGroot model [8] where
3each node updates its opinion using a weighted convex com-
bination of its neighbors’ opinions. The model developed by
Friedkin and Johnsen [9], [10] considers that, in addition to
its neighbors’ opinions, a node also gives certain weightage
to its initial biased opinion.
Acemoglu and Ozdaglar [4] review several other models of
opinion dynamics. Lorenz [11] surveys modeling frameworks
concerning continuous opinion dynamics under bounded con-
fidence, wherein nodes pay more attention to beliefs that do
not differ too much from their own. Xia, Wang, and Xuan
[12] give a multidisciplinary review of the field of opinion
dynamics as a combination of the social processes which are
conventionally studied in social sciences, and the analytical
and computational tools developed in mathematics, physics
and complex system studies. Das, Gollapudi, and Munagala
[13] show that the widely studied theoretical models of opinion
dynamics do not explain their experimental observations, and
hence propose a new model as a combination of the DeGroot
model and the Voter model [14], [15]. Parsegov et al. [16]
develop a multidimensional extension of Friedkin-Johnsen
model, describing the evolution of the nodes’ opinions on
several interdependent topics, and analyze its convergence.
Ghaderi and Srikant [17] consider a setting where a node
iteratively updates its opinion as a myopic best response to
the opinions of its own and its neighbors, and hence study
how the equilibrium and convergence to it depend on the
network structure, initial opinions of the nodes, the location
of stubborn agents (forceful nodes with unchanging opinions)
and the extent of their stubbornness. Ben-Ameur, Bianchi, and
Jakubowicz [18] analyze the convergence of some widespread
gossip algorithms in the presence of stubborn agents and
show that the network is driven to a state which exclusively
depends on the stubborn agents. Jia et al. [19] propose an
empirical model combining the DeGroot and Friedkin models,
and hence study the evolution of self-appraisal, social power,
and interpersonal influences for a group of nodes who discuss
and form opinions. Halu et al. [20] consider the case of
two interacting social networks, and hence study the case of
political elections using simulations.
Yildiz, Ozdaglar, and Acemoglu [21] study the problem of
optimal placement of stubborn agents in the discrete binary
opinions setting with the objective of maximizing influence,
given the location of competing stubborn agents. Gionis, Terzi,
and Tsaparas [1] study from an algorithmic and experimental
perspective, the problem of identifying a set of target nodes
whose positive opinions about an information item would
maximize the overall positive opinion for the item in the
network. Ballester, Calvo´-Armengol, and Zenou [22] study
optimal targeting by analyzing a noncooperative network game
with local payoff complementarities. Sobehy et al. [23] pro-
pose strategies to win an election using a Mixed Integer Linear
Programming approach.
The basic model we study is similar to that considered by
Grabisch et al. [2], that is, a zero-sum game with two camps
holding distinct binary opinion values, aiming to select a set
of nodes to invest on, so as to influence the average opinion
that eventually emerges in the network. Their study, however,
considers non-negative matrices and focuses on the existence
and the characterization of equilibria in a preliminary setting,
where the influence and cost functions are linear, camps have
network information with certainty, and there is no bound on
combined investment by the camps per node. Dubey, Garg,
and De Meyer [6] study existence and uniqueness of Nash
equilibrium, while also considering convex cost functions. The
study, however, does not consider the possibility of bounded
investment on a node, and the implications on the extent of
skewness of investment and user perception of fairness owing
to the convexity of cost functions. Bimpikis, Ozdaglar, and
Yildiz [7] provide a sharp characterization of the optimal
targeted advertizing strategies and highlight their dependence
on the underlying social network structure, in a preliminary
setting. Their study emphasizes the effect of absoption cen-
trality, which is encountered in our study as well.
The problem of maximizing information diffusion in social
networks under popular models such as Independent Cas-
cade and Linear Threshold, has been extensively studied [3],
[24], [25]. The competitive setting has resulted in several
game theoretic studies of this problem [26], [27], [28]. There
have been preliminary studies addressing interaction among
different informations, where the spread of one information
influences the spread of the others [29], [30].
There have been studies on games with constraints. A
notable study by Rosen [31] shows existence of equilibrium
in a constrained game, and its uniqueness in a strictly concave
game. Altman and Solan [32] study constrained games, where
the strategy set available to a player depends on the choice
of strategies made by other players. The authors show that,
in constrained zero-sum games, the value of the game need
not exist (that is, maxmin and minmax values need not be the
same) and contrary to general functions, maxmin value could
be larger than minmax.
The topic of decision under uncertainty has been of interest
to the game theory and optimization communities. An estab-
lished way of analyzing decision under uncertainty is using
robust optimization tools. Ben-Tal, El Ghaoui, and Nemirovski
[33] present a thorough review of such tools.
C. Contributions of the Paper
A primary goal of this work is to provide a broad framework
for optimal investment strategies for competing camps in a
social network, and propose and explore several aspects of
the problem. In particular, we study several well-motivated
variants of a constrained zero-sum game where two competing
camps aim to maximize the adoption of their respective
opinions, under the well-established Friedkin-Johnsen model
of opinion dynamics. Following are our specific contributions:
• We show that a random investment strategy is optimal
when the underlying network follows a particular popular
class of weight distributions. (Section III-C)
• We investigate when a camp’s influence on a node is
a concave function of its investment on that node, for
the cases of unbounded and bounded investment per
node. We hence provide implications for the skewness
of optimal investment strategies and user perception of
fairness. (Section IV)
4• We look at the complementary problem where a camp
acts as an adversary to the competing camp by aiming
to maximize the latter’s investment. We also look at the
problem where a camp aims to maximize the deviation
from the desired investment of the competing camp.
(Section V)
• We study the Stackelberg variant under common coupled
constraints, that the combined investment by the good and
bad camps on any given node cannot exceed a certain
limit. We study the maxmin and minmax values and
present some interesting implications. (Section VI)
• We analyze a setting where one of the camps would need
to make decision under uncertainty. (Section VII)
• Using simulations, we illustrate our analytically derived
results on real-world social networks, and present further
insights based on our observations. (Section VIII)
II. MODEL
Consider a social network with N as its set of nodes and
E as its set of weighted, directed edges. Two competing
camps (good and bad) aim to maximize the adoption of
their respective opinions in the social network. We consider a
strict competition setting where the opinion value of the good
camp is denoted by +1 and that of the bad camp by −1.
In this section, we present the parameters of the considered
model of opinion dynamics, and the update rule along with
its convergence result. We first provide an introduction to
the well-established Friedkin-Johnsen model, followed by our
proposed extension.
A. Friedkin-Johnsen Model
As per Friedkin-Johnsen model [9], [10], prior to the process
of opinion dynamics, every node holds a bias in opinion which
could have been formed owing to various factors such as the
node’s fundamental views, its experiences, past information
from news and other sources, opinion dynamics in the past,
etc. We denote this opinion bias of a node i by v0i and the
weightage that the node attributes to it by w0ii.
The network effect is captured by how much a node is
influenced by each of its friends or connections, that is, how
much weightage is attributed by a node to the opinion of each
of its connections. Let vj be the opinion held by node j and
wij be the weightage attributed by node i to the opinion of
node j. The influence on node i owing to node j is given
by wijvj , thus the net influence on i owing to all of its
connections is
∑
j∈N wijvj (where wij 6= 0 only if j is a
connection of i). It is to be noted that we do not make any
assumptions regarding the sign of the edge weights, that is,
they could be negative as well (as justified in [34], [35]). A
negative edge weight wij can be interpreted as some form of
distrust that node i holds on node j, that is, i would be driven
towards adopting an opinion that is opposite to that held or
suggested by j.
Since in Friedkin-Johnsen model, each node updates its
opinion using a weighted convex combination of its neighbors’
opinions, the update rule is given by
∀i ∈ N : vi ← w0iiv0i +
∑
j∈N
wijvj
TABLE I
NOTATION TABLE
v0i the initial biased opinion of node i
w0ii weightage given to the initial opinion by node i
wig weightage given by node i to the good camp’s opinion
wib weightage given by node i to the bad camp’s opinion
wij weightage given by node i to the opinion of node j
xi investment made by good camp to directly influence node i
yi investment made by bad camp to directly influence node i
kg budget of the good camp
kb budget of the bad camp
vi the resulting opinion of node i
where
∀i ∈ N : |w0ii|+
∑
j∈N
|wij | ≤ 1
B. Our Extended Model
We extend Friedkin-Johnsen model to incorporate the
camps’ investments and the weightage attributed by nodes
to the camps’ opinions. The good and bad camps attempt to
directly influence the nodes so that their opinions are driven
towards being positive and negative, respectively. This direct
influence depends on the investment or effort made by the
camps, and also on how much a node weighs the camps’
opinions. A given amount of investment may have different
influence on different nodes based on how much these nodes
weigh the camps’ recommendations. We denote the investment
made by the good and bad camps on node i by xi and yi
respectively, and the weightage that node i attributes to them
by wig and wib respectively. Since the influence of good camp
on node i would be an increasing function of both xi and wig ,
we assume the influence to be wigxi so as to maintain the
multilinearity of Friedkin-Johnsen model. Similarly, wibyi is
the influence of bad camp on node i. Also note that since the
good and bad camps hold the opinions +1 and −1 respectively,
the net influence owing to the direct recommendations from
these camps is (wigxi − wibyi).
The camps have budget constraints stating that the good
camp can invest a total amount of kg across all the nodes,
while the bad camp can invest a total amount of kb.
Table I presents the required notation. Consistent with the
standard opinion dynamics models, we have the condition
on the influence weights on any node i that they sum to
at maximum 1 (since a node updates its opinions using a
weighted ‘convex’ combination of the influencing factors).
∀i ∈ N : |w0ii|+
∑
j∈N
|wij |+ |wig|+ |wib| ≤ 1
A standard assumption for guaranteeing convergence of the
dynamics is ∑
j∈N
|wij | < 1
This assumption is actually well suited for our model where
we would generally have non-zero weights attributed to the
5influence outside of the network, namely, the influence due to
bias (w0ii) and campaigning (wig, wib).
Nodes update their opinions in discrete time steps starting
with time step 0. With the aforementioned factors into consid-
eration, each node i updates its opinion at each step, using the
following update rule (an extension of the Friedkin-Johnsen
update rule):
∀i ∈ N : vi ← w0iiv0i +
∑
j∈N
wijvj + wigxi − wibyi
Let v〈τ〉i be the opinion of node i at time step τ , and v
〈0〉
i = v
0
i .
The update rule can hence be written as
∀i ∈ N : v〈τ〉i = w0iiv0i +
∑
j∈N
wijv
〈τ−1〉
j + wigxi − wibyi (1)
For any node i, the static components are xi, yi, v0i (weighed
by wig, wib, w0ii), while the dynamic components are vj’s
(weighed by wij’s). The static components remain unchanged
while the dynamic ones get updated in every time step.
Let w be the matrix consisting of the elements wij for each
pair (i, j) (note that w contains only the network weights
and not wig, wib, w0ii). Let v be the vector consisting of the
opinions vi, v0 and w0 be the vectors consisting of the
elements v0i and w
0
ii respectively, x and y be the vectors
consisting of the investments xi and yi respectively, wg and
wb be the vectors consisting of the weights wig and wib
respectively. Let the operation ◦ denote Hadamard product
(elementwise product) of vectors, that is, (a ◦ b)i = aibi.
Let Hadamard power be expressed as (a◦p)i = a
p
i .
Assuming v〈τ〉 to be the vector consisting of the opinions
v
〈τ〉
i , the update rule (1) can be written in matrix form as
v〈τ〉 = wv〈τ−1〉 +w0 ◦ v0 +wg ◦ x−wb ◦ y (2)
Proposition 1. The dynamics defined by the update rule in
(2) converges to v = (I−w)−1(w0 ◦v0+wg ◦x−wb ◦y).
Proof. The recursion in (2) can be simplified as
v〈τ〉 = wv〈τ−1〉 +w0 ◦ v0 +wg ◦ x−wb ◦ y
= w
(
wv〈τ−2〉 +w0 ◦ v0 +wg ◦ x−wb ◦ y
)
+w0 ◦ v0 +wg ◦ x−wb ◦ y
= w2v〈τ−2〉 + (I+w)(w0 ◦ v0 +wg ◦ x−wb ◦ y)
= w3v〈τ−3〉 + (I+w +w2)(w0 ◦ v0 +wg ◦ x−wb ◦ y)
= wτv〈0〉 +
(
τ−1∑
η=0
wη
)
(w0 ◦ v0 +wg ◦ x−wb ◦ y)
Now, the initial opinion: v〈0〉 = v0. Also, w is a strictly
substochastic matrix, since ∀i ∈ N : ∑j∈N |wij | < 1;
its spectral radius is hence less than 1. So when τ → ∞,
we have limτ→∞wτ = 0. Since v0 is a constant, we have
limτ→∞wτv0 = 0. Furthermore, limτ→∞
∑τ−1
η=0w
η = (I−
w)−1, an established matrix identity [36]. This implicitly
means that (I−w) is invertible. Hence,
lim
τ→∞
v〈τ〉 = (I−w)−1(w0 ◦ v0 +wg ◦ x−wb ◦ y)
which is a constant vector, that is, the dynamics converges to
this steady state of opinion values.
III. THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM
We now present the fundamental problem of competitive
opinion dynamics under the Friedkin-Johnsen model.
A. Introduction of the Fundamental Problem
The problem of maximizing opinion adoption can be mod-
eled as an optimization problem. In particular, considering
perfect competition, this problem can be modeled as a maxmin
problem as we now present. Here our objective is to determine
the strategies of the good and bad camps (the values of xi and
yi such that they satisfy certain constraints), so that the good
camp aims to maximize the sum of opinion values of the nodes
while the bad camp aims to minimize it. Considering linear
constraints for setting the problem in the linear programming
framework, we represent these constraints by Ax ≤ b and
Cy ≤ d, respectively, where A,C are matrices and b, d are
vectors, in general.
Owing to xi and yi being investments, we have the natural
constraints: xi, yi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ N . We can hence write the
maxmin optimization problem in its general form as
max
Ax≤b
x≥0
min
Cy≤d
y≥0
∑
i∈N
vi
s.t. ∀i ∈ N : vi = w0iiv0i +
∑
j∈N
wijvj + wigxi − wibyi
From Proposition 1, we have
v = (I−w)−1(w0 ◦ v0 +wg ◦ x−wb ◦ y)
=⇒ 1Tv = 1T (I−w)−1(w0 ◦ v0 +wg ◦ x−wb ◦ y)
Let the constant 1T (I − w)−1 = (((I−w)−1)T1)T =(
(I−wT )−11)T = rT . So the above is equivalent to∑
i∈N
vi =
∑
i∈N
riw
0
iiv
0
i +
∑
i∈N
riwigxi −
∑
i∈N
riwibyi (3)
So our objective function becomes
max
Ax≤b
x≥0
min
Cy≤d
y≥0
∑
i∈N
riw
0
iiv
0
i +
∑
i∈N
riwigxi −
∑
i∈N
riwibyi
This can be achieved by solving two independent optimization
problems, namely,
max
Ax≤b
x≥0
∑
i∈N
riwigxi and min
Cy≤d
y≥0
∑
i∈N
riwibyi
which can be easily solved.
1) The Specific Case: Overall Budget Constraints: For
studying the problem in a broader framework, we consider
the case, specific to our model that we introduced in Section
II. This case that considers overall budget constraints kg and
kb for the good and bad camps respectively, corresponds
to
∑
i∈N xi ≤ kg and
∑
i∈N yi ≤ kb. That is, we have
A = C = 1T , b = kg, d = kb. It is clear that the solution
to this specific optimization problem is
x∗i = 0 , ∀i /∈ arg max
i∈N
riwig∑
i∈arg maxi riwig
x∗i≥0
x∗i = kg , if max
i∈N
riwig > 0 (4)
6and y∗i = 0 , ∀i /∈ arg max
i∈N
riwib∑
i∈arg maxi riwib
y∗i≥0
y∗i = kb , if max
i∈N
riwib > 0 (5)
Note that if maxi∈N riwig ≤ 0, then x∗i = 0,∀i ∈ N and if
maxi∈N riwib ≤ 0, then y∗i = 0,∀i ∈ N .
Equations (4) and (5) lead to the following result.
Proposition 2. In Setting III-A1, it is optimal for the good
and bad camps to invest their entire budgets in node i with
maximum value of riwig and riwib respectively, subject to the
value being positive.
Insight 1. Parameter ri could be interpreted as the influencing
power of node i on the network, while wig and wib are
respectively the influencing powers of the good and bad camps
on node i. So it is clear why these parameters factor into the
result. Furthermore, the strategies of the camps are mutually
independent, which arises from the sum of steady state values
of nodes as derived in (3). The multilinearity of the model
and unconstrained investment on nodes allow the camps to
exhaust their budgets by concentrating their entire investments
on a node possessing the highest value of riwig or riwib
respectively. Also, the camps’ strategies are independent of the
initial opinions, since they aim to optimize the sum of opinion
values without considering their relative values.
Actually, ri can be viewed as a variant of Katz centrality
[37] in that, Katz centrality of node i measures its relative
influence in a social network (say having adjacency matrix
A) with all edges having the same weight (say α), while ri
measures its influence in a general weighted social network.
Katz centrality of node i is defined as the ith element of vector((
I− αAT )−1− I)1 = (I− αAT )−1 1− 1, for 0<α< 1|ρ|
where ρ is the largest eigenvalue of A. In our case where
r =
(
I−wT )−1 1, A is replaced by the weighted adjacency
matrix w, for which |ρ| < 1 (since w is strictly substochastic),
and we have α = 1. The subtraction of vector 1 is common
for all nodes, so its relative effect can be ignored. ri can also
be viewed as a variant of absorption centrality of node i [7],
which captures the expected number of visits to node i in
a random walk starting at a node other than i uniformly at
random, with transition probability matrix w (assuming all
elements of w to be non-negative).
Furthermore, recall that
rT = 1T (I−w)−1 = 1T
(
I+
∞∑
η=1
wη
)
So if we have wij ≥ 0 for all pairs of nodes (i, j), we will
have that all elements of vector r are at least 1. That is, wij ≥
0,∀(i, j) =⇒ ri ≥ 1,∀i ∈ N .
2) The Case of Bounded Investment Per Node: This setting,
as motivated earlier, includes an additional bound on the
investment per node by a camp. We assume this bound to be
1 unit without loss of generality, that is, xi, yi ≤ 1,∀i ∈ N .
With respect to the generic constraints Ax ≤ b and Cy ≤ d,
this case corresponds to A = C =
(
1T
I
)
, b =
(
kg
1
)
, d =(
kb
1
)
.
From Equation (3), an optimal x can be obtained as follows.
Let Iriwig>0 = 1 if riwig > 0, and 0 otherwise. Let
ω1, ω2, . . . , ωn be the ordering of nodes in decreasing values
of riwig with any tie-breaking rule. So (3) is maximized with
respect to x when
xi = 1 · Iriwig>0, for i = ω1, . . . , ωbkgc
xi = (kg − bkgc) · Iriwig>0, for i = ωbkgc+1
xi = 0, for i = ωbkgc+2, . . . , ωn
An optimal y is analogous, hence the following result.
Proposition 3. In Setting III-A2, it is optimal for the good
camp to invest in nodes one at a time, subject to a maximum
investment of 1 unit per node, in decreasing order of values
of riwig until either the budget kg is exhausted or we reach a
node with a non-positive value of riwig . The optimal strategy
of the bad camp is analogous.
Also, from Proposition 1, if a camp’s investment per node is
bounded by 1 unit, the opinion value of every node would be
bounded between −1 and +1. As stated earlier, such bounded
opinion value is relevant to elections and product adoption
scenarios, where the bounded opinion value of a node could
be translated into the probability of the node voting for a camp
or adopting a particular product.
B. Maxmin versus Minmax Values
With no bounds on investment per node, it is clear that the
maxmin and minmax values are the same, since the strategies
of the camps are mutually independent, that is,
max
x≥0
min
y≥0
∑
i∈N
vi = min
y≥0
max
x≥0
∑
i∈N
vi (6)
The equality would hold even with mutually independent
bounds on the camps’ investment on a node, that is,
max
0≤x≤1
min
0≤y≤1
∑
i∈N
vi = min
0≤y≤1
max
0≤x≤1
∑
i∈N
vi (7)
It is to be noted that we cannot compare the values in (6) and
(7), in general. For instance, if all i’s have equal values of
riwib and only one i has good value of riwig , then for kg > 1,
the value in (6) would be greater than that in (7). This can be
seen using Equation (3); the value of
∑
i∈N ri(w
0
iiv
0
i −wibyi)
would stay the same while the value of
∑
i∈N riwigxi would
be higher in (6) than in (7). On the other hand, if all i’s have
equal values of riwig and only one i has good value of riwib,
then for kb > 1, the value in (7) would be greater than that in
(6).
C. Result for a Popular Class of Weight Distributions
We now present a result concerning a class of distribution
of edge weights in a network, which includes the popular
weighted cascade (WC) model.
Proposition 4. Let Ni = {j : wij 6= 0}, di = |Ni|, and
j ∈ Ni ⇐⇒ i ∈ Nj . If ∀i ∈ N,wig = wib = w0ii = 1α+di =
wij ,∀j ∈ Ni, where α > 0, then riwig = riwib = 1α ,∀i ∈ N .
7Proof. We know that(
I−wT )r = 1
⇐⇒ r = 1+wT r
⇐⇒ ∀i ∈ N : ri = 1 +
∑
j∈Ni
wjirj = 1 +
∑
j∈Ni
(
1
α+ dj
)
rj
Let us assume ri = γ(α+di), where γ is some constant. If
this satisfies the above equation, the uniqueness of ri ensures
that it is the only solution. Hence we have
∀i ∈ N : γ(α+ di) = 1 +
∑
j∈Ni
γ = 1 + γdi
⇐⇒ γ = 1
α
∴ ∀i ∈ N : riwig = riwib = α+ di
α
· 1
α+ di
=
1
α
The above result implies that models which assign weights
for all i such that wig = wib = w0ii =
1
α+di
= wij ,∀j ∈ Ni,
are suitable for the use of a random strategy, since the decision
parameter for either camp (riwig, riwib) holds the same value
for all nodes. That is, in these models, a random strategy that
exhausts the entire budget is optimal. This class of models
includes the popular weighted cascade model, which would
assign the weights with α = 3.
IV. EFFECT OF CONCAVE INFLUENCE FUNCTION
The linear influence function (1) without any bound on
investment per node, leads to an optimal strategy that con-
centrates the investment on a single node (Proposition 2). As
motivated in Section I-A, several social and economic settings
follow law of diminishing marginal returns, which says that
for higher investments, the marginal returns (influence in our
context) are lower for a marginal increase in investment. A
concave influence function would account for such diminish-
ing marginal influence of a camp with increasing investment
on a node which, as we shall see, would advise against
concentrated investment on a single node. For the purpose of
our analysis so as to arrive at precise closed-form expressions
and specific insights, we consider a particular form of concave
functions: x1/ti when the investment is xi. It is to be noted,
however, that it can be extended to other concave functions
since we use a common framework of convex optimization,
however the analysis could turn out to be more complicated
or intractable.
A. The Case of Unbounded Investment per Node
max∑
i xi≤kg
xi≥0
min∑
i yi≤kb
yi≥0
∑
i∈N
vi
s.t. ∀i ∈ N : vi = w0iiv0i +
∑
j∈N
wijvj + wigx
1/t
i − wiby1/ti
Proposition 5. In Setting IV-A, for t > 1, it is optimal for
the good and bad camps to invest in node i proportional to
(riwig)
t
t−1 and (riwib)
t
t−1 , subject to positivity of riwig and
riwib respectively.
A proof of Proposition 5 is provided in Appendix A.
Remark 1 (Skewness of investment). When we compare
the results for lower and higher values of t, the investment
made by the good camp has an exaggerated correlation with
the value of riwig for lower values of t. In particular, the
investment made is very skewed towards nodes with high
values of riwig when t is very low, while it is proportional
to riwig when t is very high. Note that t = 1 corresponds
to the linear case in Setting III-A1 where the investment is
extremely skewed with each camp investing its entire budget
on only one node.
Remark 2 (User perception of fairness). The skewness can
be linked to user perception of fairness [38]. Suppose a node
p is such that rpwpg = maxi riwig , and it is the unique
node with this maximum value. Suppose a node q is such that
rqwqg = rpwpg − , where  is positive and infinitesimal.
From the perspective of node q, the strategy would be fair
if the investment in q is not much less than that in p, since
they are almost equally valuable. However, t = 1 leads to a
highly skewed investment where p receives kg and q receives
0, which can be perceived as unfair by q. As t increases, the
investment becomes less skewed; in particular, t → ∞ leads
to investment on a node i to be proportional to riwig , which
could be perceived as fair by the nodes.
B. The Case of Bounded Investment Per Node
With the additional constraints xi ≤ 1 and yi ≤ 1,∀i ∈ N ,
the optimal investment strategies are given by Proposition 6.
We provide its proof in Appendix B.
Proposition 6. In Setting IV-B, if the number of nodes with
riwig > 0 is less than kg , it is optimal for good camp to invest
1 unit on each node i with riwig > 0 and 0 on all other nodes.
If the number of nodes with riwig>0 is at least kg , let γˆ > 0
be the solution of∑
i:riwig∈(0,tγ]
(
riwig
tγ
) t
t−1
+
∑
i:riwig>tγ
1 = kg
It can be shown that γˆ exists and is unique; it is then optimal
for the good camp to follow the investment strategy:
x∗i = 0, if riwig ≤ 0
x∗i = 1, if riwig > tγˆ
x∗i =
kg − ∑
i:riwig>tγˆ
1
 (riwig) tt−1∑
i:riwig∈(0,tγˆ](riwig)
t
t−1
 ,
if riwig ∈ (0, tγˆ]
The optimal strategy of the bad camp is analogous.
Note that for riwig ∈ (0, tγˆ], we can alternatively write
x∗i =
(
riwig
tγˆ
) t
t−1
, which would be between 0 and 1. So the
nodes with positive values of riwig should be classified into
two sets, one containing nodes with riwig ∈ (0, tγˆ] (for which
x∗i ∈ (0, 1]) and the other containing nodes with riwig > tγˆ
(x∗i forcefully limited to 1). So we can effectively start with
all nodes in the former set (meaning tγ ≥ maxi∈N riwig) and
then transfer nodes to the latter set as per descending values
of riwig (as we reduce tγ), until we have two sets, one with
8x∗i =
(
riwig
tγ
) t
t−1
=
(
(riwig)
t
t−1∑
i:riwig∈(0,tγ](riwig)
t
t−1
)
≤ 1 and the
other with x∗i forcefully limited to 1.
Insight 2. The solution suggests that the optimal strategy
can be obtained using a trial-and-error iterative process. A
camp could use the optimal strategy for the unbounded case
suggested in Proposition 5. If we get x∗i > 1 for any node, we
assign x∗i = 1 to node i with the highest value of riwig , and
use Proposition 5 again by excluding node i and decrementing
the available budget by 1. This process would be repeated until
x∗i ≤ 1,∀i ∈ N .
V. ACTING AS COMPETITOR’S ADVERSARY
In this setting, a camp explicitly acts to maximize the
competitor’s investment or deviation from its desired invest-
ment, that is required to drive the sign of the average opinion
value of the population in the latter’s favor. Without loss of
analytical generality, we consider that the good camp acts as
the adversary.
A. The Case of Unbounded Investment per Node
max∑
i xi≤kg
xi≥0
min
yi≥0
∑
i∈N
yi
s.t.
∑
i∈N
vi ≤ 0∑
i∈N
vi =
∑
i∈N
ri(wigxi + w
0
iiv
0
i )−
∑
i∈N
riwibyi
Proposition 7. In Setting V-A, it is optimal for the good camp
to invest its budget in node i with the maximum value of riwig ,
subject to it being positive. For the bad camp, it is optimal
to invest in node i with maximum value of riwib, subject to
its positivity. (If there does not exist any node i with positive
value of riwib, it is optimal for the bad camp to not invest at
all). The optimal amount of investment made by the bad camp
is
max
{
1
maxj∈N wjbrj
(
kg max
{
max
i∈N
riwig, 0
}
+
∑
i∈N
riw
0
iiv
0
i
)
, 0
}
A proof of Proposition 7 is provided in Appendix C.
It is to be noted that, contrary to the previous settings, the
amount of investment made by the bad camp in this setting is
dependent on the good camp’s parameters (riwig and kg) as
well as the opinion bias parameters (w0iiv
0
i ). This is because
in the previous settings, the bad camp’s objective was to mini-
mize the sum of opinion values without considering the actual
value of this sum, while the current setting necessitates the
bad camp to ensure that this sum is non-positive; this requires
taking into account the effects of good camp’s influence and
the initial biases on this sum.
Remark 3 (Maximizing competitor’s deviation). Let the de-
sired investments for the good and bad camps be x¯i and y¯i,
respectively. Thus the optimization problem is
max∑
i(xi−x¯i)2≤kg
xi≥0
min
yi≥0
∑
i∈N
(yi − y¯i)2
s.t.
∑
i∈N
vi ≤ 0∑
i∈N
vi =
∑
i∈N
ri(wigxi + w
0
iiv
0
i )−
∑
i∈N
riwibyi
Let γˆ > 0 be the solution of∑
i:riwig
≥−2γx¯i
(
riwig
2γ
)2
+
∑
i:riwig
<−2γx¯i
(x¯i)
2 = kg
Then the good camp’s optimal strategy is the following:
x∗i = 0, if riwig < −2γx¯i
= x¯i + sgn (riwig)
(
kg −
∑
i:riwig
<−2γx¯i
(x¯i)
2
) 1
2
 (riwig)2∑
i:riwig
≥−2γx¯i
(riwig)2
 12
if riwig ≥ −2γx¯i
If there does not exist a γˆ > 0 (because
∑
i:riwig<0
(x¯i)
2 < kg
and no node with riwig > 0), we invest 0 on any node with
riwig < 0 and x¯i on any node with riwig = 0.
This can be proved on similar lines as Proposition 6. Here,
(x∗i − x¯i)2 =
(
kg −
∑
i:riwig
<−2γx¯i
(x¯i)
2
) (riwig)2∑
i:riwig
≥−2γx¯i
(riwig)2

and the optimal square root is determined by sgn (riwig)
(since a positive riwig would mean a higher optimal invest-
ment as opposed to a negative riwig). Here, it is possible that a
node i is invested on by the good camp even if it has negative
riwig , so as to have the investment close to x¯i.
B. The Case of Bounded Investment per Node
The optimal strategies of the camps can be easily obtained
for this setting on similar lines as Proposition 3.
Proposition 8. In Setting V-B, it is optimal for the good camp
to invest in nodes one at a time, subject to a maximum invest-
ment of 1 unit per node, in decreasing order of values of riwig
until either the budget kg is exhausted or we reach a node
with a non-positive value of riwig . Say the so derived optimal
investment on node i is x∗i . The optimal strategy of the bad
camp is to invest in nodes one at a time, subject to a maximum
investment of 1 unit per node, in decreasing order of values
of riwib until
∑
i∈N riwibyi ≥
∑
j∈N rj(wjgx
∗
j + w
0
jjv
0
j ).
Note that the terminating condition
∑
i∈N riwibyi ≥∑
j∈N rj(wjgx
∗
j + w
0
jjv
0
j ) is same as the required condition∑
i∈N vi ≤ 0, when x∗j is the optimal investment by the good
camp on node j.
VI. COMMON COUPLED CONSTRAINTS RELATING
BOUNDS ON COMBINED INVESTMENT PER NODE
As motivated in Section I-A, a sequential play would be
more natural than a simultaneous one in certain scenarios, for
instance, in presence of a mediator or central authority which
9may be responsible for giving permissions for campaigning
or scheduling product advertisements to be presented to an
individual. We hence consider two sequential play settings,
which result in Stackelberg variants of the considered game.
We use subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as the equilibrium
notion; also since it is a zero-sum game, we refer to the
equilibrium as either maxmin or minmax, based on which
camp plays first. Without loss of analytical generality, we
conduct our analysis while assuming the good camp plays first.
The bad camp would hence choose a strategy that minimizes
the sum of opinion values as a best response to the good
camp’s strategy. Foreseeing this, the good camp would want
to maximize this minimum value; this is popularly known
as the backward induction approach. We hence derive the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy profile and the
corresponding maxmin value. The minmax profile and value
can be obtained symmetrically.
In this section, we consider a setting in which the combined
investment on a node by both camps is bounded by a certain
limit. Without loss of generality, we assume this limit to be
1 unit. This leads to the introduction of common coupled
constraints (CCC): xi + yi ≤ 1,∀i ∈ N .
max∑
i xi≤kg
xi≥0
min∑
i yi≤kb
0≤yi≤(1−xi)
∑
i∈N
vi
s.t. ∀i ∈ N : vi = w0iiv0i +
∑
j∈N
wijvj + wigxi − wibyi
The inner term is
min
∑
i∈N
vi
s.t. y ≥ 0∑
i∈N
yi ≤ kb or −
∑
i∈N
yi ≥ −kb ← α
∀i ∈ N : vi −
∑
j∈N
wijvj + wibyi = wigxi + w
0
iiv
0
i ← zi
∀i ∈ N : xi + yi ≤ 1 or − yi ≥ −(1− xi) ← γi
Its dual problem can be written as
max −αkb +
∑
i∈N
(
zi(wigxi + w
0
iiv
0
i )− γi(1− xi)
)
(8)
s.t. ∀i ∈ N : zi −
∑
j∈N
wjizj = 1 ← vi (9)
∀i ∈ N : wibzi − γi − α ≤ 0 ← yi (10)
α ≥ 0
∀i ∈ N : zi ∈ R, γi ≥ 0
As earlier, from (9), we have zi =
(
(I−wT )−11)
i
= ri. For
satisfying Constraint (10), it is required that
∀i ∈ N : riwib − γi − α ≤ 0 or γi ≥ riwib − α (11)
To maximize objective function (8), it is required that γi
should be as low as possible (knowing that 1 − xi ≥ 0). So
the above condition γi ≥ riwib − α along with γi ≥ 0 gives
∀i ∈ N : γi = max{riwib − α, 0}
So we need to maximize the objective function with respect
to γi, xi,∀i ∈ N and α. For this purpose, let us define a set
with respect to α, namely,
Jα = {j : rjwjb − α ≥ 0}
So the objective function to be maximized is
−αkb −
∑
j∈Jα
(rjwjb − α)(1− xj) +
∑
i∈N
ri(wigxi + w
0
iiv
0
i ) (12)
which is equal to
α
(∑
j∈Jα
(1−xj)− kb
)
−
∑
j∈Jα
(1−xj)rjwjb +
∑
i∈N
ri(wigxi+w
0
iiv
0
i )
(13)
Claim 1. It is sufficient to search the values of α ∈
{rjwjb}j:rjwjb>0 ∪ {0} to find an optimal solution.
Proof. Since α ≥ 0, we have α 6= rjwjb for any rjwjb < 0.
Consider a range [rlwlb, ruwub] for a consecutive pair of
distinct values of rjwjb. If a range has both these values
negative, we do not search for α in that range, since α ≥ 0.
If a range has rlwlb ≤ 0 and ruwub > 0, we search for α in
[0, ruwub]. We will now determine an optimal value of α in
the valid searchable subset of [rlwlb, ruwub], for a given x.
Case 1: If α = rlwlb (where rlwlb ≥ 0):
We have Jα = {j : rjwjb ≥ rlwlb}. The value of the objective
function (12) becomes
−rlwlbkb −
∑
j∈Jα
(rjwjb − rlwlb)(1− xj) +
∑
i∈N
ri(wigxi + w
0
iiv
0
i )
Case 2: If α ∈ (rlwlb, ruwub]:
We have Jα = {j : rjwjb ≥ ruwub}.
Case 2a: If
∑
j∈Jα(1 − xj) − kb ≥ 0, we have an optimal
α = ruwub (from (13)).
Case 2b: Instead, if
∑
j∈Jα(1−xj)−kb < 0, we have optimal
α→ rlwlb if rlwlb ≥ 0, and the optimal value is the same as
that for α = rlwlb (Case 1). Note here that if rlwlb < 0 and
ruwub ≥ 0, we would have optimal α = 0.
Case 3: If rlwlb = maxi∈N riwib, that is, when we are look-
ing for α ≥ maxi∈N riwib. For α = maxi∈N riwib, we have
Jα = {arg maxi∈N riwib} and so the term
∑
j∈Jα(rjwjb −
α)(1−xj) in (12) vanishes. For α > maxi∈N riwib, we have
Jα = {} and so the term
∑
j∈Jα(rjwjb − α)(1 − xj) in
(12) vanishes in this case too. So the objective function to
be maximized becomes
−αkb +
∑
i∈N
ri(wigxi + w
0
iiv
0
i )
for which the optimal α = maxi∈N riwib (the lowest value of
α such that α ≥ maxi∈N riwib).
The above cases show that it is sufficient to search the values
of α ∈ {rjwjb}j:rjwjb>0 ∪ {0} to determine an optimal value
of the objective function.
Now that we have established that the only possible values
of optimal α are {rjwjb}j:rjwjb>0 ∪ {0}, we can assume
optimal α = rjˆwjˆb for jˆ ∈ {j : rjwjb > 0} ∪ {d}, where
the dummy node d is such that rdwdb = 0.
Recalling the objective function in (13),
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∑
i∈N
ri(wigxi+w
0
iiv
0
i ) + α
(∑
j∈Jα
(1−xj)− kb
)
−
∑
j∈Jα
(1−xj)rjwjb
=
∑
i∈N
ri(wigxi+w
0
iiv
0
i )−
[∑
j∈Jα
(1−xj)rjwjb + α
(
kb −
∑
j∈Jα
(1−xj)
)]
=
∑
i∈N
ri(wigxi+w
0
iiv
0
i )
−
[∑
j∈Jα
(1−xj)rjwjb +
(
kb −
∑
j∈Jα
(1−xj)
)
rjˆwjˆb
]
Let Iα = {j : rjwjb > α}, Pα = {j : rjwjb = α = rjˆwjˆb}.
So the objective function is∑
i∈N
ri(wigxi+w
0
iiv
0
i )−
[ ∑
j∈Pα
(1−xj)rjwjb −
∑
j∈Pα
(1−xj)rjˆwjˆb
+
∑
j∈Iα
(1−xj)rjwjb +
(
kb −
∑
j∈Iα
(1−xj)
)
rjˆwjˆb
]
=
∑
i∈N
ri(wigxi+w
0
iiv
0
i )
−
[∑
j∈Iα
(1−xj)rjwjb +
(
kb −
∑
j∈Iα
(1−xj)
)
rjˆwjˆb
]
Comparing this with generic objective function (3) and since
it should hold for any ri, wig, wib, w0ii, v
0
i , it is necessary that
the coefficients of non-zero values of riwib are the same in
both forms of the objective function. This along with the fact
that ∀j ∈ Iα : rjwjb > 0 (since α ≥ 0), gives
∑
j∈Iα yj =∑
j∈Iα(1 − xj). Also if rjˆwjˆb > 0, then
∑
j∈Pα yj = kb −∑
j∈Iα(1−xj). And for all other terms, we have
∑
j /∈Jα yj =
0. Since ∀j ∈ N : 0 ≤ yj ≤ 1− xj , these are equivalent to
∀j ∈ Iα : yj = 1−xj , ∀j /∈ Jα : yj = 0 ,
∑
j∈Pα
yj = kb −
∑
j∈Iα
(1−xj)
(14)
To check for the consistency of budget of the bad camp,
it is necessary that
∑
j∈Iα yj ≤ kb. This gives the constraint∑
j∈Iα(1− xj) ≤ kb or equivalently,∑
j∈Iα
xj ≥ |Iα| − kb (15)
Also if rjˆwjˆb > 0, for the consistency of investment on
the nodes in Pα (that is, ∀j ∈ Pα : xj + yj ≤ 1), it is
necessary that
∑
j∈Pα yj ≤
∑
j∈Pα(1 − xj) or equivalently,
kb −
∑
j∈Iα(1− xj) ≤
∑
j∈Pα(1− xj) or equivalently,∑
j∈Iα
xj +
∑
j∈Pα
xj ≤ |Iα|+ |Pα| − kb (16)
To check for the consistency of budget of the good camp, it
is necessary that
∑
j∈Iα xj ≤ kg and
∑
j∈Iα xj+
∑
j∈Pα xj ≥
0. These along with Inequalities (15) and (16) give |Iα|−kb ≤
kg and |Iα|+ |Pα| − kb ≥ 0, or equivalently,
|Iα| ≤ kg + kb and |Iα|+ |Pα| ≥ kb (17)
The sets Iα and Pα depend only on jˆ. So let the set of jˆ’s
that satisfy the constraints in (17) be denoted by J˜ , that is,
J˜ = {jˆ : |Iα| ≤ kg + kb and |Iα|+ |Pα| ≥ kb}
The term
∑
i∈N riw
0
iiv
0
i being a constant, and substituting
α = rjˆwjˆb, objective function (12) becomes
max
x,jˆ
∑
i∈N
riwigxi +
∑
j:rjwjb≥rjˆwjˆb
xj(rjwjb − rjˆwjˆb)
−
∑
j:rjwjb≥rjˆwjˆb
(rjwjb − rjˆwjˆb)− rjˆwjˆbkb
⇐⇒ max
jˆ
[
max
x
∑
i∈N
xi(riwig + max{riwib − rjˆwjˆb, 0})
−
∑
i∈N
max{riwib − rjˆwjˆb, 0} − rjˆwjˆbkb
]
(18)
Hence the good camp’s optimal strategy can be obtained
by maximizing (18) with respect to x and jˆ ∈ J˜ , subject to
Constraints (15) and (16), and xi∈ [0, 1],∀i ∈ N .
A Greedy Approach for Determining Optimal Strategy
For a given jˆ, it can be seen from (18) that the optimal
strategy of the good camp is to determine x which maximizes∑
i∈N xi(riwig + max{riwib − rjˆwjˆb, 0}). Since Constraint
(15) should be satisfied, the minimum total investment by the
good camp on nodes belonging to set Iα should be |Iα| −
kb. Hence it should invest in nodes belonging to Iα one at a
time (subject to a maximum investment of 1 unit per node) in
decreasing order of values of (riwig+max{riwib−rjˆwjˆb, 0}),
until a total investment of |Iα| − kb is made. Let x˜i be the
good camp’s investment on node i after this step; its remaining
budget is kg − (|Iα| − kb) and the maximum amount that it
could henceforth invest on a node i is 1− x˜i (since each node
has an investment capacity of 1 unit).
Now since Constraint (16) should also be satisfied, the max-
imum total investment by the good camp on nodes belonging
to set Iα ∪ Pα should be |Iα| + |Pα| − kb. Hence it should
now invest in nodes one at a time (maximum investment of
1 − x˜i in node i) in decreasing order of values of (riwig +
max{riwib− rjˆwjˆb, 0}) until one of the following occurs: (a)
the remaining budget (kg − |Iα| + kb) is exhausted or (b) a
node with a negative value of (riwig+max{riwib−rjˆwjˆb, 0})
is reached or (c) the investment made on nodes belonging to
Iα∪Pα reaches |Iα|+ |Pα|−kb. If condition (a) or (b) is met,
the so obtained strategy x∗
jˆ
= (x∗
jˆi
) is the optimal x for the
given jˆ. However, if condition (c) is met, good camp should
continue investing the remaining available amount on nodes
belonging to N\(Iα∪Pα) one at a time (subject to a maximum
investment of 1 unit per node) in decreasing order of values
of (riwig + max{riwib− rjˆwjˆb, 0}). The so obtained strategy
x∗
jˆ
= (x∗
jˆi
) would hence be the optimal x for the given jˆ.
The absolute optimal strategy of the good camp can now
be computed by iterating over all jˆ ∈ J˜ and taking the one
that maximizes (from Expression (18))
max
jˆ∈J˜
∑
i∈N
x∗jˆi(riwig + max{riwib − rjˆwjˆb, 0})
−
∑
i∈N
max{riwib − rjˆwjˆb, 0} − rjˆwjˆbkb (19)
For the bad camp’s optimal strategy, recall that∑
i∈N
vi =
∑
i∈N
riw
0
iiv
0
i +
∑
i∈N
riwigxi −
∑
i∈N
riwibyi
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Since yi ∈ [0, 1 − xi],∀i ∈ N , the optimal strategy of the
bad camp is to invest in nodes one at a time (subject to a
maximum investment of 1− xi per node) in decreasing order
of values of riwib until either its budget kb is exhausted or
we reach a node with a negative value of riwib.
It can also be seen that if kg and kb are integers, it is an
optimal investment strategy of the good and bad camps to
invest one unit or not invest at all in a node.
Insight 3. Assuming a jˆ, the strategy of the good camp is
to choose nodes with good values of (riwig + max{riwib −
rjˆwjˆb, 0}). That is, it chooses nodes with not only good values
of riwig , but also good values of riwib. This is expected since
the budget constraint per node allows the good camp (which
plays first) to block those nodes on which the bad camp would
have preferred to invest. Also, based on (14) and the definitions
of Jα, Iα, Pα, node jˆ can be viewed as a boundary for the bad
camp’s investment, that is, the bad camp would not invest in
any node i such that riwib < rjˆwjˆb.
Time Complexity of the Greedy Approach
For a given jˆ, the above greedy approach would require
the good camp to select a total of O(kg) nodes to invest on.
This could be done by either (a) iteratively choosing a node
with the maximum value of (riwig + max{riwib− rjˆwjˆb, 0})
according to the greedy approach or (b) presorting the nodes
as per decreasing values of (riwig + max{riwib − rjˆwjˆb, 0})
and then choosing nodes according to the greedy approach.
The time complexity of (a) would be O(nkg) and that of (b)
would be O(n log n+kg) = O(n log n). Hence, following (a)
would be more efficient if kg << log n, while (b) would be
better if kg >> log n (else, asymptotically indifferent between
the two). So its time complexity is O(n ·min{kg, log n}).
Now, the absolute optimal strategy is computed by iterating
over all jˆ ∈ J˜ . Based on (14) and the definitions of Jα, Iα, Pα,
node jˆ can be viewed as a boundary for the bad camp’s
investment since it would not invest in any node i such that
riwib < rjˆwjˆb. So if the nodes are ordered in decreasing
order of riwib values, such a node jˆ would be in a position
no later than dkg + kbe (this limiting case is met if the good
camp invests kg in nodes with the highest values of riwib, and
then the bad camp invests kb in nodes with the highest values
of riwib which are not exhaustively invested on by the good
camp). So the possible jˆ’s are at most the top dkg+kbe nodes
in the sorted order of riwib, hence determining the possible
jˆ’s requires O(min{nkb, n log n}) time and the number of
possible jˆ’s is O(kg + kb).
Since the absolute optimal strategy of the good camp is
computed by iterating over all jˆ ∈ J˜ , the overall time
complexity of the greedy approach is O(min{nkb, n log n}+
(kg + kb) · n · min{kg, log n}), which is same as O(n(kg +
kb) ·min{kg, log n}).
Maxmin versus Minmax Values
Here, we compare the maxmin and minmax values of the
game in the fundamental setting (Section III-B) with that in the
common coupled constraints setting. The introduction of the
total budget constraints per node disturbs the equality between
maxmin and minmax, as we show now. Let (x′,y′) be an
optimal maxmin strategy profile in (7). Adding the constraint
0 ≤ y ≤ 1−x restricts the set of feasible strategies for the bad
camp, and this set of feasible strategies and hence its optimal
strategy now depends on x. So we have
max
0≤x≤1
min
0≤y≤1
∑
i∈N
vi ≤ max
0≤x≤1
min
0≤y≤1−x
∑
i∈N
vi
Similarly,
min
0≤y≤1
max
0≤x≤1
∑
i∈N
vi ≥ min
0≤y≤1
max
0≤x≤1−y
∑
i∈N
vi
These two inequalities, along with (7), result in the following
inequality,
max
0≤x≤1
min
0≤y≤1−x
∑
i∈N
vi ≥ min
0≤y≤1
max
0≤x≤1−y
∑
i∈N
vi (20)
This result, which is contrary to general functions (for which
maxmin is less than or equal to minmax), has also been derived
in [32]. In our problem, this is a direct consequence of the first
mover advantage, which restricts the strategy set of the second
mover. In the maxmin case as analyzed earlier, the good camp
invests in nodes with good values of (riwig + max{riwib −
rjˆwjˆb, 0}) (assuming a jˆ). That is, it is likely to invest in nodes
with good values of riwib which are the preferred investees
of the bad camp. Owing to total investment limit per node,
the bad camp may not be able to invest in its preferred nodes
(those with high values of riwib). It can be shown on similar
lines that, in the minmax case where the bad camp plays first,
it would play symmetrically opposite, thus limiting the ability
of good camp to invest in nodes with good values of riwig .
Remark 4 (CCC under simultaneous play). If instead of
sequential play, the two camps play simultaneously under CCC
setting, it can be seen that the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium
is not guaranteed (an immediate example is that the maxmin
and minmax values could be different). We address this precise
question in [39] for general resource allocation games, albeit
assuming strict preference ordering of the camps over nodes.
Therein, however, we do not derive an equilibrium strategy
profile since there could be infinite number of Nash equilibria.
In order to derive a precise strategy profile which would be of
practical and conceptual interest, we considered a sequen-
tial play in this paper and computed the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium. For the case where the Nash equilibrium
is unique, the sequence of play would not matter (that is,
the maxmin and minmax values would be the same), and
our derived subgame perfect Nash equilibrium would be the
unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
VII. DECISION UNDER UNCERTAINTY
In this section, we look at another sequential play setting
which considers the possibility that the good camp, which
plays first, may not have complete or exact information
regarding the extrinsic weights, namely, wig, wib, w0ii. The bad
camp, however, which plays second, has perfect information
regarding the values of these parameters, and hence it is known
that it would act optimally. Forecasting the optimal strategy
of the bad camp, the good camp aims at choosing a robust
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strategy which would give it a good payoff even in the worst
case.
Let u =

u1
...
un
, where ui =
 w0iiwig
wib
. That is, u =(
w011 w1g w1b · · · w0nn wng wnb
)T
.
Let U be a polytope defined by Eu ≤ f (that is, u ∈ U ). It
can be viewed as the uncertainty set, which in this case, is a
convex set. The polytope would be based on the application at
hand and could be deduced from observations, predictions, etc.
We use the framework of robust optimization [33] for solving
this problem.
For the purpose of this section, let us assume that all the
elements of u are non-negative. This is to ensure bounded
values of the parameters. For instance, if we have a constraint
in the linear program such as wig + wib + w0ii ≤ θi, the
individual values wig, wib, w0ii can be unbounded. So for this
current setting (under uncertain parameters), we will assume
wig, wib, w
0
ii ≥ 0,∀i ∈ N .
Since the good camp aims to optimize in the worst case of
parameter values, while the bad camp has knowledge of these
values with certainty, the optimization problem is
max∑
i xi≤kg
xi≥0
min
Eu≤f
min∑
i yi≤kb
yi≥0
∑
i∈N
riwigxi +
∑
i∈N
riw
0
iiv
0
i −
∑
i∈N
riwibyi
If maxj∈N rjwjb > 0, that is, the bad camp has at least
one feasible node to invest on, then we have
∑
i∈N riwibyi =
kb maxj∈N rjwjb, else we have
∑
i∈N riwibyi = 0. For
arriving at a concise solution, let d be a dummy node
such that rdwdb = 0. So now we have
∑
i∈N riwibyi =
kb maxj∈N∪{d} rjwjb. The optimization problem thus is
max∑
xi≤kg
xi≥0
min
u
∑
i∈N
riwigxi +
∑
i∈N
riw
0
iiv
0
i − kb max
j∈N∪{d}
rjwjb
s.t. Eu ≤ f
Note that there are in general n + 1 possibilities for
maxj∈N∪{d} rjwjb. We could write a linear program for
each possibility of i0 = arg maxj∈N∪{d} rjwjb. For a fixed
i0 ∈ N ∪ {d}, the inner term is
min
u
∑
i∈N
riwigxi +
∑
i∈N
riw
0
iiv
0
i − kbri0wi0b
s.t. Eu ≤ f ← αi0
∀i ∈ N : riwib ≤ ri0wi0b ← βi0i
For this problem to be feasible, the constraint set should be
non-empty. Let Nf be the subset of N ∪ {d} consisting of
nodes i0 such that the constraint set satisfying Eu ≤ f and
∀i ∈ N : riwib ≤ ri0wi0b is non-empty. Its dual is:
max−αTi0f
s.t. ∀i ∈ N \ {i0} : −αTi0Eib − βi0iri ≤ 0 ← wib
if i0 6= d : −αTi0Ei0b +
∑
i 6=i0
βi0iri0 ≤ −kbri0 ← wi0b
∀i ∈ N : −αTi0Eig ≤ rixi ← wig
∀i ∈ N : −αTi0Eii ≤ riv0i ← w0ii
αi0 ≥ 0
∀i ∈ N : βi0i ≥ 0
We need to find a common x for all possibilities of i0 ∈ Nf .
So we have a constraint on the value of the dual, say ρ,
namely, ρ ≤ −αTi0f, ∀i0. We hence obtain a solution to the
optimization problem by solving the following LP.
max ρ
s.t.
∑
i∈N
xi ≤ kg
∀i ∈ N : xi ≥ 0
∀i0 ∈ Nf :

ρ+ αTi0f ≤ 0
∀i ∈ N \ {i0} : −αTi0Eib − βi0iri ≤ 0
if i0 6= d : −αTi0Ei0b +
∑
i 6=i0
βi0iri0 ≤ −kbri0
∀i ∈ N : −αTi0Eig − rixi ≤ 0
∀i ∈ N : −αTi0Eii ≤ riv0i
αi0 ≥ 0
∀i ∈ N : βi0i ≥ 0
We solve the above LP for a specific example in our
simulation study, so as to derive insights on the effect of
uncertainty on the optimal strategy of the good camp.
VIII. SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS
Throughout this paper, we analytically derived the optimal
investment strategies of competing camps in a social network
for driving the opinion of the population in their favor. We
hence presented either closed-form expressions or algorithms
with polynomial running time. With the aim of determining
implications of the analytically derived results on real-world
networks and obtaining further insights, we conducted a sim-
ulation study on two popular network datasets. In this section,
we present the setup and observed results, and provide insights
behind them.
A. Simulation Setup
We consider an academic collaboration network obtained
from co-authorships in the “High Energy Physics - Theory”
papers published on the e-print arXiv from 1991 to 2003. It
contains 15,233 nodes and 31,376 links among them, and is
popularly denoted as NetHEPT. This network exhibits many
structural features of large-scale social networks and is widely
used for experimental justifications, for example, in [24], [40],
[41]. For the purpose of graphical illustration, we use the
popular Zachary’s Karate club dataset consisting of 34 nodes
and 78 links among them [42].
Our analyses throughout the paper are valid for any distribu-
tion of edge weights satisfying the general constraints in Sec-
tion II-B. However, in order to concretize our simulation study,
we need to consider a particular distribution of edge weights.
Proposition 4 showed that some popular models of distributing
edge weight in a graph would result in random strategy being
optimal, and so are not suited for our simulations. Hence in
order to transform an undirected unweighted network dataset
into a weighted directed one for our simulations, we consider
that for any node i (having di number of connections), the
tuple (w0ii, wig, wib) is randomly generated such that
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(a) The value of wig (b) The value of wib (d) The value of ri
Fig. 1. Details about the Karate club dataset used in our simulations. The size and color saturation of a node i represent the value of the parameter.
(a) τ = 1 (maxxminy
∑
i v
〈τ〉
i =−0.0342) (b) τ = 2 (maxxminy
∑
i v
〈τ〉
i =0.2058) (d) τ = 4 (maxxminy
∑
i v
〈τ〉
i =0.1566)
Fig. 2. Progression of opinion values for Karate club dataset with kg=kb=5 under linear influence function with unbounded investment per node. Opinions
of nodes are signified by their shapes, sizes, color saturations (circular blue nodes: positive opinions, square red nodes: negative opinions)
∀i ∈ N : w0ii + wig + wib = 0.5, and
wij =
1−(w0ii + wig + wib)
di
, if there is an edge between i and j.
A primary reasoning for considering w0ii +wig +wib = 0.5
is to have a natural first guess that nodes give equal weightage
to intra-network influencing factors ({wij}j∈N ) and extra-
network influencing factors (w0ii, wig, wib). We provide results
for the extreme cases in Appendix D, namely, when the value
of w0ii+wig+wib is 0.1 or 0.9 (with the values of the individual
parameters scaled proportionally). We also highlight some key
effects of this value on the obtained results, throughout this
section.
Figure 1 presents the values of the parameters used for our
experimentation on the Karate club dataset, considering our
weight distribution with w0ii + wig + wib = 0.5. The size
and color saturation of a node i represent the value of the
parameter mentioned in the corresponding caption (bigger size
and higher saturation implies higher value). Unless otherwise
specified, we consider kg = kb = 5 for this dataset. Also,
unless otherwise specified, we start with an unbiased network,
that is, v0i = 0,∀i ∈ N .
Progression with time: Throughout this paper, our analyses
were based on the steady state opinion values. However for
the purpose of completion, we now provide a brief note on
the progression of opinion values with time, which occurs
according to our update rule given by (1).
Figure 2 illustrates the progression of opinion values with
time under the linear influence function and unbounded in-
vestment per node, where
∑
i∈N v
〈τ〉
i is the sum of opinion
values of nodes in time step τ . The network starts with
v0i = 0,∀i ∈ N , and then at τ = 1, the good and bad camps
invest their entire budgets on their respective target nodes
having maximum values of riwig and riwib, respectively.
Hence the opinion values of these nodes change to being
highly positive and negative respectively, while other nodes
still hold an opinion value of 0 (Figure 2(a)). At τ = 2, nodes
which are directly connected to these target nodes, update their
opinions; as seen from Figure 2(b), nodes in the left region
hold positive opinions while the ones in the right region hold
negative opinions. Few nodes like the ones on the top, center,
and extreme right regions, still hold an opinion value of 0. By
τ = 3, all nodes hold a non-zero opinion value and at τ = 4,
the individual opinion values and hence the sum of opinion
values almost reach the convergent value. The sum of opinion
values at τ = 4 is 0.1566 (Figure 2(c)), while the convergent
sum is 0.1564 (Table II). In general, assuming the threshold
of convergence to be 10−4, the convergence is reached in 8-10
time steps for the Karate club dataset, and in 12-15 time steps
for the NetHEPT dataset.
An important insight is that any significant changes in the
opinion value of a node occur in the earlier time steps. For in-
stance, a node which is geodesically closer to the target nodes
receive influence from them in the earlier time steps, and also
the influence is strong since the entries of the substochastic
weight matrix wτ are significantly higher for lower values of
τ . Hence, owing to the substochastic nature of wτ , the change
in a node’s opinion value is insignificant at a later time step.
We could also observe that the rate of convergence depends
on the investment strategies, for instance, the convergence
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TABLE II
RESULTS FOR KARATE CLUB AND NETHEPT DATASETS
Setting
Section
Karate club NetHEPT
Aspect Case kg kb Results kg kb Results
Fundamental Unbounded III-A1
5 5 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi = 0.1564 100 100 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi = 73.2539
10 5 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi = 5.8811 200 100 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi = 347.0770
Bounded III-A2 5 5 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi = −0.0538 100 100 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi = 2.8513
Adversary
Unbounded V-A 5 - maxxminy
∑
i∈N yi = 5.1404 100 - maxxminy
∑
i∈N yi = 136.5231
Bounded V-B 5 - maxxminy
∑
i∈N yi = 4.8936 100 - maxxminy
∑
i∈N yi = 102.7266
Concave (t = 2)
Unbounded IV-A
5 5 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi = 0.4581 100 100 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi = −0.8446
20 20 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi = 0.9163 400 400 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi = −1.6892
Bounded IV-B
5 5 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi = 0.4612 100 100 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi = −0.8446
20 20 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi = 1.2653 400 400 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi = −1.7117
Concave (t = 10)
Unbounded IV-A
5 5 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi = 1.1180 100 100 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi = −12.4212
20 20 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi = 1.2842 400 400 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi = −14.2682
Bounded IV-B
5 5 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi = 1.1180 100 100 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi = −12.4212
20 20 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi = 1.3104 400 400 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi = −14.2682
CCC Bounded VI 5 5
maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi = 1.5399
100 100
maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi = 7.4843
minymaxx
∑
i∈N vi = −0.8900 minymaxx
∑
i∈N vi = −3.6795
is almost immediate under the concave influence function
setting where the investment is already distributed over nodes
(see Figures 11-12 in Appendix D); since this investment is
made in the earliest time step, it plays a significant role in
determining the nodes’ convergent opinion values. Also, it is
usually observed that the individual opinion values as well as
sum of opinion values are, more often than not, monotone
increasing or decreasing with time (see Figures 11-14 in
Appendix D).
B. Simulation Results
Table II presents the quantitative results of our simulations
on Karate club and NetHEPT datasets. (The results for w0ii +
wig +wib = 0.1 and 0.9 are provided in Tables III and IV of
Appendix D.)
1) The fundamental setting: For both the datasets, the
overall opinion value is positive in the fundamental unbounded
setting (III-A1) when both camps had the same budget (first
row of Table II), which implies that the maximum value of
riwig in the network was higher than the maximum value
of riwib (as clear from Equation (3) and Proposition 2). The
results of the good camp doubling its budget can also be seen
(second row of Table II). When both camps had the same
budget, their overall influences tend to nullify each other to
a great extent and so the sum of opinion values is neither
exceedingly positive nor exceedingly negative. However, with
the good camp doubling its budget, this additional budget
could be used to have a large surplus of positive influence
in the network. Actually, owing to close competition, even
a slight imbalance in the camps’ budgets would result in
significant skewness in the overall opinion of the network.
The effect of bounded investment (Setting III-A2) can also
be seen (third row of Table II); for these particular datasets,
the maxmin value decreases implying that the value of riwig is
probably concentrated on one node, while that of riwib is well
distributed, thus giving the bad camp an advantage in bounded
(and hence distributed) investment. This can be seen from
Proposition 3. Figure 4(a) illustrates the case with bounded
investment per node (xi, yi ≤ 1,∀i ∈ N ) for the Karate club
dataset. Here, the label ‘c’ means that, that node is invested
on by both the camps with 1 unit, while ‘g’ or ‘b’ mean that
the node is invested on by the good or bad camp, respectively.
2) The adversary setting: Considering the adversary setting
of maximizing the competitor’s (bad camp’s) investment, we
could see how much budget the bad camp required to draw the
overall opinion in its favor. As expected from the results of the
above setting where the overall opinion value turns out to be
positive when the camps have the same budget, the investment
required in the unbounded case of Setting V-A (5.1404 for
Karate club and 136.5231 for NetHEPT) is more than the
budget available in Setting III-A1 (5 for Karate club and 100
for NetHEPT). In the bounded setting (V-B), for Karate club
dataset, we can see that the bad camp could have driven
the overall opinion in its favor by expending 4.8936 instead
of its entire budget of 5. For NetHEPT dataset, as expected
from the results of the fundamental setting where the overall
opinion in the bounded setting (III-A2) was less than that in
the unbounded setting (III-A1), the investment required by the
bad camp in the bounded setting (V-B), which is 102.7266, is
less than that required in the unbounded setting (V-A), which
is 136.5231.
3) Concave influence function: Results under the concave
influence function are presented for both unbounded (IV-A)
and bounded (IV-B) cases for t = 2 and t = 10, in Table II.
Figure 3 shows the effect of the value of t on the distribution
of investment and final opinion values for the Karate club
dataset, in the unbounded case. In Figures 3(a),(b),(d),(e), the
size and color saturation of a node represent the amount of
15
(c) Final opinion values of nodes signified
(a) Investment made by good camp (b) Investment made by bad camp by shapes, sizes, color saturations for t = 2
on nodes signified by their sizes on nodes signified by their sizes (Circular blue nodes: positive opinions,
and color saturations for t = 2 and color saturations for t = 2 square red nodes: negative opinions)
(f) Final opinion values of nodes signified
(d) Investment made by good camp (e) Investment made by bad camp by shapes, sizes, color saturations for t = 10
on nodes signified by their sizes on nodes signified by their sizes (Circular blue nodes: positive opinions,
and color saturations for t = 10 and color saturations for t = 10 square red nodes: negative opinions)
Fig. 3. Simulation results for the Karate club dataset with kg = kb = 5 when the influence function is concave (Setting IV-A)
investment on it by the camp mentioned in the corresponding
caption. With careful observation, it can be seen that for
t = 2, the investments are more skewed, while for t = 10,
the investments by the good and bad camps on a node i are
close to being proportional to the values of riwig and riwib,
respectively (as suggested in Proposition 5 and Remark 1). In
Figures 3(c) and 3(f), the shape and color of a node represent
its opinion sign (blue circle implies positive, red square implies
negative), while its size and color saturation represent its
opinion magnitude.
In the unbounded case, for some values of budgets, there
exist nodes for which either xi or yi or both exceed 1 unit.
So for the bounded case, the camps are directed to have
different investment strategies than in the unbounded case
(as can be understood from Insight 2). The effects can be
seen in Table II where the values are different in Settings
IV-A and IV-B for the same values of budgets. In some
scenarios such as NetHEPT with kg = kb = 100, however, the
investment strategies inadvertently assured xi, yi ≤ 1,∀i ∈ N
even for the unbounded case; so the investment strategies
remain the same in both settings and hence resulted in the
same overall opinion value (−0.8446 for t = 2 and −12.4212
for t = 10). A careful analysis of the values would indicate
that the constraints xi, yi ≤ 1 are likely to come into picture
for some nodes, for lower values of t and higher values of
budgets. Lower values of t lead to skewed investment and so
a higher likelihood of some nodes having investment more
than 1 unit in the unbounded case. Similarly, higher values of
budgets scale up the investments on the nodes, resulting in a
higher likelihood of some nodes having investment more than
1 unit in the unbounded case. This can also be inferred from
our analytically derived investment strategies.
For w0ii + wig + wib = 0.1 (see Figure 9 of Appendix D),
the values of extra-network parameters (w0ii, wig, wib = 0.1)
get scaled down proportionally, while the intra-network ones
(wij’s) scale up; that is, the network influence plays a stronger
role than the camps’ recommendations. Because of the weak
impact of the camps’ recommendations, that is, the nodes
being unwilling to accept opinions that are external to the net-
work, and since all nodes started with a zero initial opinion, the
magnitudes of their opinion values are very low. Furthermore,
because of the strong impact of the intra-network influence,
the camps invest greatly on the most influential nodes (and
not so much on the lesser influential ones), and allow the
network to spread its influence. Owing to the low magnitudes
of opinion values and a strong network effect which aids in
distributing the influence evenly, the opinion values in the
network are less skewed. For w0ii + wig + wib = 0.9 (see
Figure 10 of Appendix D), the above reasoning gets reversed,
and so the magnitudes of individual opinion values are high,
the camps’ investments are more evenly distributed, and the
opinion values are highly skewed.
4) Common coupled constraints: Figures 4 (b-c) illustrate
the effect of common coupled constraints xi+yi ≤ 1,∀i ∈ N ,
for the Karate club dataset. The advantage of playing first is
clearly visible from the overall opinion value as well as the
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(a) Bound on investment per node (b) Common coupled constraints (c) Common coupled constraints
xi, yi ≤ 1,∀i xi + yi ≤ 1,∀i xi + yi ≤ 1,∀i
(maxx miny
∑
i vi = −0.0538) (maxx miny
∑
i vi = 1.5399) (miny maxx
∑
i vi = −0.8900)
Fig. 4. Results in presence of additional constraints for the Karate club dataset with kg = kb = 5 ; The nodes are labeled ‘g/b/c’ to signify if invested on
by good/bad/both camps respectively. The sign of the opinion value of a node is signified by its shape and color (circle and blue for good, square and red for
bad), while the absolute value of its opinion is signified by its size and color saturation.
distribution of opinion values. Specifically, the overall opinion
value is the highest in Figure 4(b) with a healthy distribution
of positive opinion values, followed by the value in Figure
4(a), followed by that in Figure 4(c) which is dominated by
negative opinions.
For w0ii + wig + wib = 0.9,∀i ∈ N on NetHEPT
dataset, we observed that maxx miny≤1−x
∑
i∈N vi =
miny maxx≤1−y
∑
i∈N vi = 1.5930 (see Table IV of Ap-
pendix D). So the camps did not have the first mover advan-
tage; and it would not matter if the camps played sequentially
or simultaneously (Remark 4). Hence the camp which plays
first, could devise its investment strategy without having to
consider the best response investment strategy of the camp
which plays second. Also, as reasoned earlier, the opinion
values are less skewed for w0ii+wig+wib = 0.1, while highly
skewed for w0ii + wig + wib = 0.9.
5) Decision under uncertainty: For studying the effects of
decision under uncertainty as analyzed in Section VII, we
consider that the good camp (first mover) is uncertain about
parameters wig and wib up to a certain limit. In particular,
there is a fractional uncertainty of l regarding the values of
these parameters, while there is a fractional uncertainty of o
regarding the values of the sums of these parameters over the
entire network. l can be hence viewed as local uncertainty and
o as global uncertainty. Let wˆig and wˆib be the underlying
ground truth values for a node i (the actual values destined to
be realized).
(1− l)wˆig ≤ wig ≤ (1 + l)wˆig
(1− l)wˆib ≤ wib ≤ (1 + l)wˆib
(1− o)
∑
i∈N
wˆig ≤
∑
i∈N
wig ≤ (1 + o)
∑
i∈N
wˆig
(1− o)
∑
i∈N
wˆib ≤
∑
i∈N
wib ≤ (1 + o)
∑
i∈N
wˆib
It is clear that the latter two constraints would come into
picture only if o < l (this would usually be the case since,
though there may be significant relative deviation for the
individual parameters, the relative deviation of their sum is
usually low owing to significant balancing of positive and
negative deviations of the individual parameters). For different
values of l and o, Figure 5 presents the maxmin values:
(a) as computed by the good camp (first mover) as its worst
Fig. 5. The worst case and realized values of the maxmin value for different
values of l and o for the Karate club dataset with kg = kb = 5
Fig. 6. Investment made by good camp on nodes signified by their sizes and
color saturations for the Karate club dataset with kg = kb = 5 (under high
uncertainty)
case value using our robust optimization approach and (b) as
realized based on the ground truth. We assume the ground
truth values as depicted in Figure 1. It can be seen that for a
large enough range of values of l and o, though the good
camp computes the worst case maxmin value to be very low,
the corresponding realized value is the same as when the good
camp is certain about parameter values. The uncertainty factor
starts affecting the good camp only for very high l and o.
As clear from our linear program formulation in Sec-
tion VII, the optimal strategy of the good camp under
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uncertainty is a pessimistic one, that is, ensuring that the
good camp performs well even in the worst case. Hence it
is fundamentally different from the optimal strategy under
certainty, where there is no requirement of being pessimistic
or optimistic since all the information required to solve the
optimization problem is known with certainty. As pointed
above, the uncertainty factor plays a role only for very high
values of l and o. Specifically, for values of l upto 0.6, the
good camp’s investment is concentrated on one node, like in
the certainty setting (Proposition 2). For l in excess of 0.6,
the distribution of investment showed a very similar nature
across different values of l and o; Figure 6 illustrates how
the good camp distributes its investment over nodes. Thus,
the investment is distributed under high levels of uncertainty,
while it is concentrated on one node under certainty as well
as under low levels of uncertainty. Furthermore, one could
notice a clear correlation between the values of wig (Figure
1(a)) and the investment amounts on the corresponding nodes
under high uncertainty (Figure 6).
IX. CONCLUSION
Using a variant of Friedkin-Johnsen model for opinion
dynamics, we studied a zero-sum game framework for optimal
investment strategies for two competing camps in a social
network. We derived closed form expressions and efficient al-
gorithms for a number of well-motivated settings. We showed
all the results quantitatively as well as illustratively using
simulations on network datasets.
Our analysis arrived at a decision parameter analogous
to Katz centrality. We also showed that for some of the
popular models of weighing edges, a random strategy is indeed
optimal. We further looked at a setting where the influence of
a camp on a node is a concave function of the amount of
investment, and derived that a more concave function results
in a less skewed investment strategy, which could be perceived
as a fairer strategy by the nodes. We studied an adversarial
problem where a camp aims to maximize its competitor’s
investment required to drive the average opinion value of the
population in its favor, and saw that the optimal strategies
fundamentally remain the same, albeit with different forms of
the exact optimal strategies.
We studied Stackelberg variant of the game, under common
coupled constraints stating the bound on combined investment
by the two camps on any node. We analytically derived the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategies of the camps, and
hence quantified the first-mover advantage. We derived a linear
program for obtaining optimal strategy for a camp to whom the
parameters’ values are uncertain, while playing against a camp
having exact information. In our simulations, we observed that
a camp is likely to get affected only under considerably high
levels of uncertainty. Here, the optimal strategy is to have a
distributed investment over nodes, as against the concentrated
investment in the exact information setting.
Future Work
This work has several interesting directions for future work;
we mention a few. The two camps setting can be extended to
multiple camps where each camp would attempt to drive the
opinion of the population towards its own. With more than
two camps, we would need to have the camps hold opinions
in a multidimensional plane rather than on the real number
line (+1/−1). We explain one way in which this could be
done. Let each camp (say h) have a vector associated with its
opinion (say ~ch). Let its investment on node i be denoted by
zhi and the weightage attributed by i to the camp’s opinion
be wih. Analogous to Equation (3), the vector-sum of nodes’
opinions could be written as∑
i∈N
~vi =
∑
i∈N
riw
0
ii~v
0
i +
∑
h
∑
i∈N
riwihzhi~ch
A camp’s objective would be to drive this vector-sum towards
the direction of its own opinion vector, that is, to maximize
the inner product between the vector-sum of nodes’ opinions
and its own opinion vector (that is, ~ch ·
∑
i∈N ~vi). This paper
studied the special case where we have two camps: h = g, b
with ~cg = +1,~cb = −1 and zgi = xi, zbi = yi. Since the
optimization terms for different camps get decoupled under
the settings in Sections 3 and 4, the optimization strategies of
all camps would be analogous to those derived in this paper.
However, our set of equations will not be directly adaptable
for the CCC and uncertainty settings, and is an interesting
direction for future work.
One could study other models of opinion dynamics with
respect to optimal investment strategies of competing camps
and investigate if it is possible to arrive at closed form expres-
sions under them. One such type of models could be where
the investment parameters get coupled in the optimization
problem, and the sum of opinion values is no longer a multilin-
ear function in the investment parameters {xi}i∈N , {yi}i∈N .
Another possible future direction is to study the setting of
common coupled constraints under more complex constraints,
while maintaining analytical tractability; our analysis in this
paper could act as a conceptual base for solving such a
problem. In general, it would be interesting to consider hybrid
settings which combine the individually studied settings in this
paper, for instance, a concave influence function with the cost
function accounting for deviation from the desired investment.
It would also be interesting to study the tradeoff between the
advantages and disadvantages of playing first, since playing
first would allow a camp to block certain investments of the
competing camp (like in common coupled constraints) but it
may also force it to take decision under uncertainty.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Proof. We make the following one-to-one transformation:
yi = Yti and xi = X ti . So the above optimization problem
is equivalent to
max∑
i X ti≤kgXi≥0
min∑
i Yti≤kbYi≥0
∑
i∈N
vi
s.t. ∀i ∈ N : vi −
∑
j∈N
wijvj + wibYi = wigXi + w0iiv0i
Similar to the derivation of Equation (3) in main text, we get∑
i∈N
vi =
∑
i∈N
ri(wigXi + w0iiv0i )−
∑
i∈N
riwibYi (21)
Owing to the mutual independence between X¯ and Y¯
(where X¯ and Y¯ are the vectors with components Xi and
Yi respectively), we can write
max∑
i X ti≤kgXi≥0
min∑
i Yti≤kbYi≥0
∑
i∈N
vi
=
∑
i∈N
riw
0
iiv
0
i + max∑
i X ti≤kgXi≥0
∑
i∈N
riwigXi − max∑
i Yti≤kbYi≥0
∑
i∈N
riwibYi
We now solve for the first optimization term with respect to
X¯ , which can be written as the following convex optimization
problem
min −
∑
i∈N
riwigXi
s.t.
∑
i∈N
X ti − kg ≤ 0 ← γ
∀i ∈ N : −Xi ≤ 0 ← βi
The modified objective function with the Lagrangian mul-
tipliers is
g = −
∑
i∈N
riwigXi + γ
(∑
i∈N
X ti − kg
)
−
∑
i∈N
βiXi
The KKT conditions with the modified objective function g
give the following additional constraints
∀i ∈ N : ∂g
∂Xi = −riwig + tγX
t−1
i − βi = 0 (22)
γ ≥ 0 (23)
∀i ∈ N : βi ≥ 0 (24)
γ
(∑
i
X ti − kg
)
= 0 (25)
∀i ∈ N : βiXi = 0 (26)
Constraint (22) gives
Xi =
(
βi + riwig
tγ
) 1
t−1
(27)
Note that if γ = 0, Constraint (22) gives βi + riwig =
0,∀i ∈ N . Since βi ≥ 0, this can hold only when riwig ≤
0,∀i ∈ N . For nodes with riwig = 0, the value of riwigXi
stays 0 for any Xi and so Xi = 0 is an optimal solution. For
nodes with riwig < 0, we must have βi > 0 and hence Xi = 0
(from (26)).
Henceforth we assume γ > 0 and so Equation (27) is valid.
This, with (25) and (23), gives∑
i∈N
X ti = kg
From (27), we get∑
i∈N
(
βi + riwig
tγ
) t
t−1
= kg
⇐⇒
(
1
tγ
) 1
t−1
=
k
1
t
g(∑
i∈N (βi + riwig)
t
t−1
) 1
t
This, with (27) gives
X ∗i = k
1
t
g
 (βi + riwig) 1t−1(∑
j∈N (βj + rjwjg)
t
t−1
) 1
t
 (28)
Now, the following cases are possible depending on the sign
of riwig .
Case 1: If riwig < 0, we must have βi > 0 (from the
constraint X ∗i ≥ 0). This with (26) gives X ∗i = 0.
Case 2: If riwig = 0, we must have X ∗i = βi = 0 (from
(26) and (27)).
Furthermore in both Case 1 and Case 2, from (27), we have
βi + riwig = 0. So the i-terms for which riwig ≤ 0 vanish
from the denominator of (28) and it transforms into
X ∗i = k
1
t
g
 (βi + riwig) 1t−1(∑
j:rjwjg>0
(βj + rjwjg)
t
t−1
) 1
t
 , if riwig ≥ 0
(29)
and X ∗i = 0, if riwig < 0
Case 3: If riwig > 0, we get X ∗i > 0 (from (24)). This
with (26) gives βi = 0, and hence from (29), we get
X ∗i = k
1
t
g
 (riwig) 1t−1(∑
j:rjwjg>0
(rjwjg)
t
t−1
) 1
t

The above cases can be concisely written as
X ∗i = k
1
t
g
 (riwig) 1t−1(∑
j:rjwjg>0
(rjwjg)
t
t−1
) 1
t
 · Iriwig>0
⇐⇒ x∗i = kg
 (riwig) tt−1∑
j:rjwjg>0
(rjwjg)
t
t−1
 · Iriwig>0 (30)
where Iriwig>0 = 1 if riwig > 0, and 0 otherwise.
Similarly, it can be shown that
y∗i = kb
 (riwib) tt−1∑
j:rjwjb>0
(rjwjb)
t
t−1
 · Iriwib>0 (31)
From the optimization problem, it can be directly seen that,
if ∀i ∈ N, riwig ≤ 0, then x∗i = 0,∀i ∈ N . Similarly, if
∀i ∈ N, riwib ≤ 0, then y∗i = 0,∀i ∈ N .
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
Proof. This proof goes as an extension to the proof of Propo-
sition 5, with the additional constraint
∀i ∈ N : Xi ≤ 1 ← ξi (32)
Equation (22) changes to
∀i ∈ N : −riwig + tγX t−1i − βi + ξi = 0 (33)
and Equation (27) changes to
Xi =
(
βi − ξi + riwig
tγ
) 1
t−1
(34)
The complementary slackness conditions for the additional
constraints are
∀i ∈ N : ξi(Xi − 1) = 0 (35)
Further note that the constraints Xi ≥ 0 and Xi ≤ 1 cannot
both be tight, and so at least one of βi or ξi must be 0. That
is,
∀i ∈ N : βiξi = 0 (36)
When γ = 0, Equation (33) transforms into βi−ξi+riwig =
0,∀i ∈ N . Now if riwig = 0, we must have βi − ξi = 0 and
hence βi = ξi = 0 (from Equation (36)). It is further clear
from the objective function that if riwig = 0, it is optimal to
have Xi = 0 and hence x∗i = 0. If riwig < 0, we must have
βi > 0 (since βi− ξi + riwig = 0) and so Xi = x∗i = 0 (from
Equation (26)). If riwig > 0, we must have ξi > 0 and so
Xi = x∗i = 1 (from Equation (35)). That is, when γ = 0, we
invest an amount of 1 on all nodes i with positive values of
riwig and 0 on all other nodes.
γ = 0 =⇒ x∗i = 1 · Iriwig>0 (37)
For γ > 0, we have∑
i∈N
X ti = kg
⇐⇒
∑
i∈N
(
βi − ξi + riwig
tγ
) t
t−1
= kg
When βi > 0, we have ξi = 0 (from (36)) and Xi = 0 (from
(26)). From the above equation, this corresponds to riwig < 0.
Further note that for riwig = 0, Xi = 0 is an optimal solution.
So we have
∑
i:riwig>0
(−ξi + riwig
tγ
) t
t−1
= kg
We can have Xi = 1 or if not, we should have ξi =
0. So for any i such that riwig > 0, we have Xi =
min
{(
riwig
tγ
) 1
t−1
, 1
}
. Let Jγ = {i : 0 < riwig ≤ tγ}. So
the above equation results in
∑
i∈Jγ
(
riwig
tγ
) t
t−1
+
∑
i/∈Jγ
i:riwig>0
1 = kg (38)
⇐⇒
(
1
tγ
) t
t−1
=
kg −∑i/∈Jγ ,i:riwig>0 1∑
i∈Jγ (riwig)
t
t−1
Note that if i ∈ Jγ , then any j for which rjwjg < riwig
belongs to Jγ . So Jγ and hence γ can be determined by adding
nodes to Jγ , one at a time in increasing order of riwig , subject
to riwig > 0. Let γˆ be the value of γ so obtained. It can be
seen that as γ decreases, the left hand side of (38) increases.
Since the right hand side is a constant, we would obtain a
unique γˆ satisfying the equality. Furthermore, for γ > 0, this
budget constraint is tight and so we are ensured the existence
of γˆ. Once γˆ and hence Jγˆ are obtained, an optimal solution
for the good camp can be expressed as follows (recall that
xi = X ti ):
If riwig ≤ 0, x∗i = 0.
If riwig > tγˆ, x∗i = 1.
If 0 < riwig ≤ tγˆ,
x∗i =
(
kg −
∑
i/∈Jγˆ
i:riwig>0
1
) (riwig) tt−1∑
i∈Jγˆ (riwig)
t
t−1

However, if Equation (38) is not satisfied for any γ, that is,
when ∑
i∈Jγ
(
riwig
tγ
) t
t−1
+
∑
i/∈Jγ
i:riwig>0
1 < kg
even for the lowest value of γ > 0, we have Jγ = {} and
hence
∑
i:riwig>0
1 < kg . Here, the number of nodes with
riwig > 0 is less than kg , meaning that the budget constraint
is not tight and so γ = 0 (from Equation (25)). The investment
is thus as per Equation (37).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7
Proof.
max∑
i xi≤kg
xi≥0
min
yi≥0
∑
i∈N
yi
s.t.
∑
i∈N
vi ≤ 0∑
i∈N
vi =
∑
i∈N
ri(wigxi + w
0
iiv
0
i )−
∑
i∈N
riwibyi
The inner term of this optimization problem is
min
∑
i∈N
yi
s.t.
∑
i∈N
riwibyi ≥
∑
i∈N
ri(wigxi + w
0
iiv
0
i ) ← pi
∀i ∈ N : yi ≥ 0
It is clear that if
∑
i∈N ri(wigxi + w
0
iiv
0
i ) ≤ 0, it is
optimal for the bad camp to have yi = 0,∀i ∈ N , that is,
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TABLE III
RESULTS FOR KARATE CLUB DATASET FOR DIFFERENT VALUES OF w0ii + wig + wib
Setting
Section kg kb Value of
w0ii + wig + wib
Aspect Case 0.1 0.5 0.9
Fundamental Unbounded 3.1.1
5 5 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi 0.1141 0.1564 0.1723
10 5 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi 7.6575 5.8811 3.5673
Bounded 3.1.2 5 5 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi −0.0678 −0.0538 0.3309
Adversary
Unbounded 5.1 5 - maxxminy
∑
i∈N yi 5.0768 5.1404 5.2674
Bounded 5.2 5 - maxxminy
∑
i∈N yi 4.8542 4.8936 5.6844
Concave (t = 2)
Unbounded 4.1
5 5 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi 0.3545 0.4581 0.5435
20 20 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi 0.7089 0.9163 1.0870
Bounded 4.2
5 5 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi 0.3931 0.4612 0.5435
20 20 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi 1.4950 1.2653 1.0714
Concave (t = 10)
Unbounded 4.1
5 5 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi 1.2512 1.1180 1.0120
20 20 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi 1.4373 1.2842 1.1625
Bounded 4.2
5 5 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi 1.2512 1.1180 1.0120
20 20 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi 1.5027 1.3104 1.1633
CCC Bounded 6 5 5
maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi 2.8105 1.5399 0.3951
minymaxx
∑
i∈N vi −1.8655 −0.8900 0.2581
∑
i∈N yi = 0. So we need to only consider the case where∑
i∈N ri(wigxi + w
0
iiv
0
i ) > 0. In this case, for the constraint∑
i∈N vi ≤ 0 to be satisfied, it is necessary that there exists
a node j with positive value of rjwjb.
The dual problem of the above optimization problem can
be written as
maxpi
∑
i∈N
ri(wigxi + w
0
iiv
0
i )
s.t. ∀i ∈ N : piriwib ≤ 1 ← yi
pi ≥ 0
From the dual constraints, we have pi ≤ 1maxj∈N rjwjb (recall
that maxj∈N rjwjb > 0 in this considered case). Since we aim
to maximize the dual objective function, we have
pi =
1
maxj∈N wjbrj
The optimization problem now becomes
max∑
xi≤kg
xi≥0
pi
∑
i∈N
ri(wigxi + w
0
iiv
0
i )
= pi
 max∑
xi≤kg
xi≥0
∑
i∈N
riwigxi +
∑
i∈N
riw
0
iiv
0
i

=
1
maxj∈N wjbrj
(
kg max
{
max
i∈N
riwig, 0
}
+
∑
i∈N
riw
0
iiv
0
i
)
The above expression thus gives the total investment made by
the bad camp in the case where (kg max{maxi∈N riwig, 0}+∑
i∈N riw
0
iiv
0
i ) > 0.
Accounting for the case that it optimal for the bad camp
to have yi = 0,∀i ∈ N when (kg max{maxi∈N riwig, 0} +
∑
i∈N riw
0
iiv
0
i ) ≤ 0, the total investment made by the bad
camp is
max
{
1
maxj∈N wjbrj
(
kg max{max
i∈N
riwig, 0}+
∑
i
riw
0
iiv
0
i
)
, 0
}
APPENDIX D
FURTHER SIMULATION RESULTS
The following pages present simulation results not included
in the main text.
• The quantitative results for Karate club and NetHEPT
datasets for different values of w0ii + wig + wib are
presented in Tables III and IV, respectively.
• The illustrative results for Karate club dataset under ad-
ditional constraints such as bounded investment per node
and common coupled constraints, when w0ii+wig+wib =
0.1 and 0.9 are presented in Figures 7 and 8, respectively.
• The illustrative results for Karate club dataset under
concave influence function when w0ii + wig + wib = 0.1
and 0.9 are presented in Figures 9 and 10, respectively.
• The illustrations for progression of opinion values in
Karate club dataset under different settings are presented
in Figures 11-14.
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TABLE IV
RESULTS FOR NETHEPT DATASET FOR DIFFERENT VALUES OF w0ii + wig + wib
Setting
Section kg kb Value of
w0ii + wig + wib
Aspect Case 0.1 0.5 0.9
Fundamental Unbounded 3.1.1
100 100 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi 145.9562 73.2539 13.5988
200 100 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi 626.5203 347.0770 131.4902
Bounded 3.1.2 100 100 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi 7.6865 2.8513 1.5930
Adversary
Unbounded 5.1 100 - maxxminy
∑
i∈N yi 143.6201 136.5231 113.0391
Bounded 5.2 100 - maxxminy
∑
i∈N yi 105.1987 102.7266 101.9037
Concave (t = 2)
Unbounded 4.1
100 100 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi 2.8513 −0.8446 −1.7849
400 400 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi 5.7026 −1.6892 −3.5698
Bounded 4.2
100 100 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi 2.8513 −0.8446 −1.7849
400 400 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi 2.3493 −1.7117 −3.5698
Concave (t = 10)
Unbounded 4.1
100 100 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi −7.3610 −12.4212 −13.9045
400 400 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi −8.4556 −14.2682 −15.9721
Bounded 4.2
100 100 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi −7.3610 −12.4212 −13.9045
400 400 maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi −8.4556 −14.2682 −15.9721
CCC Bounded 6 100 100
maxxminy
∑
i∈N vi 28.5077 7.4843 1.5930
minymaxx
∑
i∈N vi −19.2724 −3.6795 1.5930
(a) Bound on investment per node (b) Common coupled constraints (c) Common coupled constraints
xi, yi ≤ 1,∀i xi + yi ≤ 1,∀i xi + yi ≤ 1,∀i
(maxx miny
∑
i vi = −0.0678) (maxx miny
∑
i vi = 2.8105) (miny maxx
∑
i vi = −1.8655)
Fig. 7. Results in presence of additional constraints for the Karate club dataset with kg = kb = 5 ; The nodes are labeled ‘g/b/c’ to signify if invested on
by good/bad/both camps respectively. The sign of the opinion value of a node is signified by its shape and color (circle and blue for good, square and red for
bad), while the absolute value of its opinion is signified by its size and color saturation. (w0ii + wig + wib = 0.1)
(a) Bound on investment per node (b) Common coupled constraints (c) Common coupled constraints
xi, yi ≤ 1,∀i xi + yi ≤ 1,∀i xi + yi ≤ 1,∀i
(maxx miny
∑
i vi = 0.3309) (maxx miny
∑
i vi = 0.3951) (miny maxx
∑
i vi = 0.2581)
Fig. 8. Results in presence of additional constraints for the Karate club dataset with kg = kb = 5 ; The nodes are labeled ‘g/b/c’ to signify if invested on
by good/bad/both camps respectively. The sign of the opinion value of a node is signified by its shape and color (circle and blue for good, square and red for
bad), while the absolute value of its opinion is signified by its size and color saturation. (w0ii + wig + wib = 0.9)
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(c) Final opinion values of nodes signified
(a) Investment made by good camp (b) Investment made by bad camp by shapes, sizes, color saturations for t = 2
on nodes signified by their sizes on nodes signified by their sizes (Circular blue nodes: positive opinions,
and color saturations for t = 2 and color saturations for t = 2 square red nodes: negative opinions)
(f) Final opinion values of nodes signified
(d) Investment made by good camp (e) Investment made by bad camp by shapes, sizes, color saturations for t = 10
on nodes signified by their sizes on nodes signified by their sizes (Circular blue nodes: positive opinions,
and color saturations for t = 10 and color saturations for t = 10 square red nodes: negative opinions)
Fig. 9. Simulation results for the Karate club dataset with kg = kb = 5 when the influence function is concave (w0ii + wig + wib = 0.1)
(c) Final opinion values of nodes signified
(a) Investment made by good camp (b) Investment made by bad camp by shapes, sizes, color saturations for t = 2
on nodes signified by their sizes on nodes signified by their sizes (Circular blue nodes: positive opinions,
and color saturations for t = 2 and color saturations for t = 2 square red nodes: negative opinions)
(f) Final opinion values of nodes signified
(d) Investment made by good camp (e) Investment made by bad camp by shapes, sizes, color saturations for t = 10
on nodes signified by their sizes on nodes signified by their sizes (Circular blue nodes: positive opinions,
and color saturations for t = 10 and color saturations for t = 10 square red nodes: negative opinions)
Fig. 10. Simulation results for the Karate club dataset with kg = kb = 5 when the influence function is concave (w0ii + wig + wib = 0.9)
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(a) τ = 1 (maxxminy
∑
i v
〈τ〉
i =0.3037) (b) τ = 2 (maxxminy
∑
i v
〈τ〉
i =0.3681) (d) τ = 4 (maxxminy
∑
i v
〈τ〉
i =0.4353)
Fig. 11. Progression of opinion values for the Karate club dataset with kg = kb = 5 when the influence function is concave (t = 2)
(a) τ = 1 (maxxminy
∑
i v
〈τ〉
i =0.4956) (b) τ = 2 (maxxminy
∑
i v
〈τ〉
i =0.7986) (d) τ = 4 (maxxminy
∑
i v
〈τ〉
i =1.0362)
Fig. 12. Progression of opinion values for the Karate club dataset with kg = kb = 5 when the influence function is concave (t = 10)
(a) τ = 1 (maxxminy
∑
i v
〈τ〉
i =−0.2375) (b) τ = 2 (maxxminy
∑
i v
〈τ〉
i =0.8117) (d) τ = 4 (maxxminy
∑
i v
〈τ〉
i =1.3420)
Fig. 13. Progression of opinion values for the Karate club dataset with kg = kb = 5 under common coupled constraints (maxmin value)
(a) τ = 1 (minymaxx
∑
i v
〈τ〉
i =0.1775) (b) τ = 2 (minymaxx
∑
i v
〈τ〉
i =−0.4655) (d) τ = 4 (minymaxx
∑
i v
〈τ〉
i =−0.7709)
Fig. 14. Progression of opinion values for the Karate club dataset with kg = kb = 5 under common coupled constraints (minmax value)
